Fast-Food Government and Physician-Assisted Death: The Role of Direct Democracy in Federalism by DuVivier, K. K.
  
[895] 
 
 
 
 
Articles 
K.K. DUVIVIER∗ 
Fast-Food Government and 
Physician-Assisted Death:  The 
Role of Direct Democracy in 
Federalism 
 
I.  Federalism and Direct Democracy ................................... 900 
 A.  State Legislative Processes .......................................... 904 
 1.  Pressure Points in the Traditional Legislative 
Process..................................................................... 905 
 
∗ Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  I would like 
to dedicate this Article to my parents, Dr. Edward Keyes DuVivier and Mrs. 
Marjorie Attebery DuVivier.  They have supported and encouraged me in this work 
and throughout my life.  To me, they are the ultimate models of lives lived with 
wisdom and dignity.  I also would like to thank the following for their valuable input 
and assistance in completing this piece:  J. Robert Brown, Diane Burkhardt, Robert 
Chang, David McDaniel, Kalin Ivany, Nora Pincus, and the members of the Legal 
Writing Institute’s 2007 Writer’s Workshop. 
OREGON
LAW 
REVIEW
         2007 
VOLUME 86 
NUMBER 4 
 
 896 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 895 
 2.  The Citizen Initiative Process................................ 907 
 B.  The Benefit of Fast-Food Initiatives for 
Innovation..................................................................... 912 
 1.  Local Legislative Experimentation....................... 915 
 2.  The History of Initiatives for Innovation............. 917 
 3.  Initiatives for Moral Issues .................................... 921 
II.  Federalism in the Physician-Assisted Death Debate...... 924 
 A.  On the Federal Side of the Federalism Balance:  
A Federal Constitutional Right to Choose Death ... 930 
 1.  The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment ............. 930 
 2.  But No Right to Die ............................................... 933 
 3.  Federal Legislation ................................................. 942 
 B.  On the State Side of the Federalism Balance:  
State Legislation and Initiatives................................. 945 
 1.  Action by State Legislators.................................... 947 
 2.  Action by Citizen Initiatives.................................. 959 
 3.  Federal Affronts to Oregon’s Death with 
Dignity Act ............................................................. 963 
Conclusion ...................................................................................... 971 
 
 
homas Jefferson argued that the key to lasting government 
was flexibility and a process for change.1  When establishing 
the representative form of government in the United States, the 
 
1 Thomas Jefferson stated: 
[I]t may be proved that no society can make a perpetual constitution, or 
even a perpetual law.  The earth belongs always to the living generation.  
They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during 
their usufruct. . . . Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires 
at the end of 19 years.  If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not 
of right. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 5 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 115, 121 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895);  see 
also Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword:  The Direct Ballot and State Constitutionalism, 28 
RUTGERS L.J. 787, 788 (1997) (addressing changes in the constitutional context, 
Jefferson wrote, “[L]et us provide in our constitution for its revision at stated 
periods . . . so that it may be handed on, with periodical repairs, from generation to 
generation, to the end of time, if anything human can so long endure” (quoting 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON:  WRITINGS 1395, 1402 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984))).  Alexander 
U.S.C Hamilton also conceded that “‘the right of the people to alter or abolish the 
established Constitution’ must be seen as a ‘fundamental principle of republican 
government.’”  Scheiber, supra, at 788 n.3 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 
489, 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1996)). 
T 
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Founders ensured that change would come gradually by setting 
up an inefficient system of checks and balances.2  This 
deliberative process sought to produce compromises reflecting 
both minority and majority views.3  Maintaining some continuity 
and consensus on issues helped avoid abrupt pendulum swings in 
policy.  The Founders’ efforts resulted in one of the most 
enduring governments in the world. 
As is often the case, however, a strength can become a 
weakness if carried to extremes.  At times throughout our 
nation’s history, special interests have learned to employ the 
deliberative process to deadlock legislatures and paralyze the 
decision-making process.  In the late 1800s, members of the 
Progressive movement introduced an alternative to legislatures 
controlled by special interests:  direct democracy through state-
wide citizen initiatives.  Although none of the original state 
constitutions allowed citizens to impact legislation directly 
through citizen initiatives,4 the Progressives successfully 
introduced the process in several Western states from 1897 to 
1918.5  Currently, almost half of the states allow citizens to 
 
2 See Steven A. Siegel, Historicism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional 
Thought, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431, 1479 n.265 (“[T]he whole scheme was so 
contrived with checks and balances, that the governmental action should be steady, 
the changes gradual, and progress uniform.” (quoting JOHN NORTON POMEROY, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 86 
(1868))). 
3 See, e.g., Derek W. Black, The Contradiction Between Equal Protection’s 
Meaning and Its Legal Substances:  How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 559 (2006). 
4 Direct democracy comes in many forms and varies widely from state to state.  
Some distinguish an “initiative” as a measure that citizens originate by petition from 
a “referendum” that is legislation originating from a legislature and referred to the 
people for a vote.  K.K. DuVivier, By Going Wrong All Things Come Right:  Using 
Alternative Initiatives to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1185, 1185 
n.2, 1191 n.42 (1995).  A number of terms are also used to describe the process such 
as “plebiscite,” “proposition,” or “amendment.”  Id. at 1185 n.2.  For purposes of 
this Article, the term “initiative” will generically encompass any direct democracy 
mechanism that forces a legislature to consider a matter outside the standard 
representative process. 
5 The states to first adopt the initiative process between 1898 and 1918 include 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS 16–
17 (1989); see also K.K. DuVivier, The United States as a Democratic Ideal?  
International Lessons in Referendum Democracy, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 821, 830–33 
(2006). 
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initiate laws either to their representatives or to a direct vote of 
the people.6 
The initiative process is controversial; some see it as “fast-
food government”–unhealthy fare because it creates laws 
quickly, bypassing the slower, more deliberative legislative 
process.7  Other commentators have argued that initiatives are 
especially well suited to bring about progress in the area of 
political reform, sidestepping self-interested representatives to 
impose term limits or campaign spending limitations when they 
have no incentive to make such changes legislatively.8  Similarly, 
initiatives can be a mechanism to advance social reform.  
Particularly at nascent stages, these types of controversial 
reforms may be difficult to navigate through the legislative 
process.  Citizen initiatives will often be the only available 
method for altering the legal regime to advance these reforms. 
This Article will focus on the benefits of initiatives in 
contributing to one of the goals of federalism:  fostering 
innovation by allowing the states to serve as Brandeis 
laboratories.9  Addressing controversial issues through “fast-
 
6 The initiative right was lost in some of the original states, and a handful of states 
and the District of Columbia added initiatives between 1956 and 1977.  The 
following states currently allow some form of initiative:  Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  See DAVID B. MAGLEBY, 
DIRECT LEGISLATION 36 (1984); Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of 
Direct Democracy:  Why the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the 
American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 15 (1997). 
7 “We live in a society of instant gratification, but our government was designed 
by the Founders to be slow and deliberative.  The initiative process is just fast-food 
government for people who don’t want to follow the standard political process.”  
Brandon C. Shaffer, Colo. State Senator, What Is the Political and Legal Future of 
Colorado’s Initiative?, Remarks at the University of Colorado School of Law’s 14th 
Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Conference, The Voice of the Crowd–Colorado’s Initiative 
Process (Jan. 26, 2007). 
8 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Preferences, Priorities, and Plebiscites, 13 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 317, 334–36 (2004); Sherman J. Clark, The Character of Direct 
Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 341, 347–48 (2004); Richard L. Hasen, 
Comments on Baker, Clark, and Direct Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
563, 564 (2004). 
9 The concept of “states as laboratories” comes from Justice Brandeis’s dissent in 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).  Justice Brandeis stated: 
There must be power in the states and the nation to remould, through 
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing 
social and economic needs. . . . 
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food government” can promote the evolution of innovation.  
Because initiatives have been the first, or sometimes the only, 
successful mechanisms for addressing some progressive issues, 
they illustrate the benefits of this dispersed form of federalism. 
The debate over physician-assisted death, or PAD,10 provides 
a concrete illustration.  Even though a majority of Americans 
support the right of patients to make their own decisions about 
end-of-life care, including the right to choose death, some 
religious and other interest groups have influenced the 
traditional legislative process to prevent PAD legislation from 
becoming law.  Only one state, Oregon, has successfully passed a 
PAD law, and this success was through the fast-food initiative 
process.  Oregon may now serve as a Brandeis laboratory to help 
the entire country address the controversial issue of PAD.  
While Part I of this Article provides a framework for the debate, 
Part II illustrates the significant role the initiative process can 
play in promoting this valuable benefit of federalism. 
 
 . . .  It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country. 
Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
10 This Article focuses on the process of enacting legislation rather than on the 
particular form of physician-assisted death (“PAD”).  Consequently, throughout 
the Article, the generic term PAD refers to the most widely accepted form:  (1) 
voluntary use (2) by mentally competent patients (3) who are terminally ill (4) of 
legal drugs prescribed to them by licensed physicians (5) to hasten death.  In 
contrast to “euthanasia,” “physician-assisted suicide,” or “death with dignity,” PAD 
is a value-neutral term now encouraged by the American Psychological Association.  
See Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Death (May 
2007), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/2007-05.pdf [hereinafter Vollmar, 
May 2007 Developments] (“[T]he reasoning on which a terminally ill person (whose 
judgments are not impaired by mental disorders) bases a decision to end his or her 
life is fundamentally different from the reasoning a clinically depressed person uses 
to justify suicide.”). 
 It is also encouraged by the American Public Health Association (urging 
“accurate, value-neutral terms such as ‘aid in dying’ or ‘patient directed dying’”), 
and the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine (noting PAD 
“‘captures the essence of the process in a more accurately descriptive fashion than 
the more emotionally charged designation’ of physician-assisted suicide”).  Id.; see 
also Stephen W. Smith, Book Review, 13 MED. L. REV. 286, 287 (2005) (arguing 
that the media routinely confused the issue of PAD with the practice of euthanasia, 
creating negative images); Don Colburn, Oregon Officials Seek Neutral Term for 
“Assisted Suicide,” NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 15, 2006.  Furthermore, in 
this Article, I will not specifically address the issue of “palliative care,” which allows 
a physician to administer pain relief instead of curative treatment to terminally ill 
patients.  See infra notes 155–63 and accompanying text. 
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I 
FEDERALISM AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
“Federalism,” a mantra frequently voiced by U.S. politicians 
and judges, is the “constitutional balance between the States and 
the Federal Government” 11 that makes the U.S. political system 
exemplary.12  Federalism contemplates a key role for local as 
well as national authority, but because of the modern 
centralization of power at the federal level, some commentators 
debate whether the construct has any true value.13 
As originally configured, the Constitution “split the atom of 
sovereignty”14 in the new nation by granting the federal 
government limited, “enumerated” powers and reserving to the 
states the remaining authority to regulate the affairs of their 
citizens.15  However, that balance has been disrupted:  the 
federal government’s commerce power has metastasized to 
consume nearly every semblance of state authority.16  Before 
1937, the Supreme Court resisted expansion of Commerce 
Clause authority, fearing it would leave “nothing left to the 
realm of state police regulation.”17  However, the Court threw in 
 
11 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006). 
12 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution 
protects us from our own best intentions:  It divides power among sovereigns and 
among branches of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation to 
concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the 
day.”); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–60 (1991) (cataloguing the 
benefits of the federal structure). 
13 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 317 
(1997). 
14 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
15 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); see also Larry Kramer, 
Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1490–91, 1495 n.18 (1994) 
(arguing that there was consensus among the Framers that the powers of the 
national government would be limited). 
16 For a wonderful synopsis of the progression, see Friedman, supra note 13, at 
328–38. 
17 Id. at 333; see, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495, 546 (1935) (“If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises 
and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate 
commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the 
people and the authority of the State over its domestic concerns would exist only by 
sufferance of the federal government.”); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272–
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the towel in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.,18 
expanding the federal commerce power “beyond judicially 
enforceable limits.”19 
In the last few decades, the Court’s decisions have contained 
rhetoric about the value of federalism as a guiding principle 
while “accord[ing] barely any weight to the state side of the 
federalism balance.”20  Yet, the Constitution provides that the 
powers not explicitly delegated to the federal government have 
been “reserved to the states respectively, or to the people,”21 and 
 
73 (1918), overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (“If it 
were otherwise, all manufacture intended for interstate shipment would be brought 
under federal control to the practical exclusion of the authority of the States, a 
result certainly not contemplated by the framers of the Constitution when they 
vested in Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the States.”); United 
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 19 (1895) (“Undoubtedly, the preservation of 
the just authority of the States is an object of deep concern to every lover of his 
country.  No greater calamity could befall our free institutions than the destruction 
of that authority, by whatever means such a result might be accomplished.”). 
18 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
19 Friedman, supra note 13, at 334; see also id. at 334–35 n.69 (citing Vincent A. 
Cirillo & Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflections on the Congressional Commerce Power, 60 
TEMP. L.Q. 901, 912 (1987) (stating that during the New Deal, “the congressional 
commerce power emerged as a virtually unlimited power and, in effect, became the 
national police power rejected by the Framers at the Constitutional Convention”); 
Jonathan L. Entin, The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 635, 636 (1996) (“The Court struggled . . . for more than a century 
before the New Deal transformation ushered in a doctrinal structure suggesting that 
there were no judicially enforceable limits on the commerce power.”); Richard A. 
Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1451 
(1987) (arguing that the New Deal Supreme Court “rejected the idea of limited 
federal government and decentralized power” in favor of a centralized government 
acting for the public welfare); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure 
Seriously:  Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1259 (1995) (“In addition, since the New Deal ‘switch,’ the 
Commerce Clause power in particular has been understood to be remarkably 
inclusive.  Consequently, the universe of legitimate ends has expanded to such a 
degree that it now seems almost brazen to suggest that there is anything Congress 
may not do.”)). 
20 Id. at 321–22. 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 
779, 847–48 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas stated: 
 In each State, the remainder of the people’s powers–“[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States,”–are either delegated to the state government or retained by 
the people. . . . 
 These basic principles are enshrined in the Tenth Amendment, which 
declares that all powers neither delegated to the Federal Government nor 
prohibited to the States “are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
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federalism contemplates dispersal of power and some role for 
the states within the federal system. 
In a few instances, the Supreme Court has begun to articulate 
the benefit of shifting some weight back to state-side deference.22  
While the Court has declared it “unwise to attempt to identify a 
list of ‘traditional’ state functions,”23 the federalization of issues 
traditionally identified as local matters, such as crime, has 
brought criticism.24  Likewise, the balance has also shifted in the 
areas of economics, the environment, and civil rights.  In the last 
century, many problems were “best solved at the national 
 
people.”  With this careful last phrase, the Amendment avoids taking any 
position on the division of power between the state governments and the 
people of the States:  It is up to the people of each State to determine 
which “reserved” powers their state government may exercise.  But the 
Amendment does make clear that powers reside at the state level except 
where the Constitution removes them from that level.  All powers that the 
Constitution neither delegates to the Federal Government nor prohibits to 
the States are controlled by the people of each State. 
Id. (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
22 See Freidman, supra note 13, at 363; see also id. at 363 n.203 (citing Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 575–76 (1985) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (discussing how state and local governments are better able than the 
national government to perform activities that affect the everyday lives of citizens)).  
Justice Powell noted: 
State and local officials of course must be intimately familiar with 
[traditionally local] services and sensitive to their quality as well as cost.  
Such officials also know that their constituents and the press respond to the 
adequacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services.  It is this kind of state 
and local control and accountability that the Framers understood would 
insure the vitality and preservation of the federal system that the 
Constitution explicitly requires. 
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 578–79. 
23 Friedman, supra note 13, at 361; see id. at 361 n.189 (“We therefore now reject, 
as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from 
federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular 
governmental function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’  Any such rule leads to 
inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic self-
governance, and it breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from those 
principles.” (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546–47)). 
24 See id. at 375; see also id. at 375 n.250 (citing Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal 
Mischief:  The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 
1166–72 (1995) (arguing that Congress must exercise restraint in federalizing 
criminal law); Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime:  Some 
Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 
U. KAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1995) (expressing the belief that “many matters of ‘local 
concern’ are presently being federalized by Congress”)). 
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level,”25 but more recently, local action has led the way on 
economic and environmental issues.26  In addition, many state 
constitutions now afford greater civil rights protections for 
citizens than they enjoy under the Federal Constitution.27 
Placing more weight on the state side of the federalism 
equation has a number of advantages.  For one, it helps avoid 
dissatisfaction with a remote federal government.  Proponents of 
“anti-nationalizing movements . . . reflect[] unease among the 
people about the extent to which governmental authority is 
slipping from their grasp.”28  Respect for state authority under 
the concept of federalism can assuage those who bristle because 
of the “disadvantages [of] overweening national authority.”29  
Initiatives force local representatives to be in touch directly with 
their constituents’ desires.  Thus, the initiative process can be 
 
25 Id. at 367 (referencing the civil rights advantages); see also id. at 374 (listing the 
areas of environmentalism and consumerism in addition to civil rights).  Initiative 
advocates also called for a Constitutional Amendment to create a National 
Initiative in the late 1970s.  See, e.g., LAURA TALLIAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY 120–
21 (1977).  However, that movement appears to have almost completely died.  
DuVivier, supra note 5, at 867. 
26 For example, New Hampshire residents are voting on a state referendum 
addressing global climate change.  Katie Zezima, In New Hampshire, Towns Put 
Climate on the Agenda, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8.  Kurt Ehrenberg, from 
the Sierra Club’s New Hampshire office, noted that “the lack of federal leadership 
on this issue [has] forced people to find a solution on the local level.”  Id.  In the 
United States, concern about the democracy deficit has been expressed frequently 
in the context of environmental law.  See Freidman, supra note 13, at 392 (citing 
Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim:  A New Framework to 
Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 849–54 (1996–
97)); id. at 392 n.317 (“By regulating vital decisions about environmental risk 
management through a remote, arcane, and piecemeal bureaucratic process, the 
command and control system necessarily runs a serious democracy deficit.” 
(quoting Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation:  A Failing 
Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 590 (1996))).  But see id. at 318 n.4 (citing Daniel C. 
Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 648–52 (1996) 
(arguing that the participation of uninformed citizens in environmental regulatory 
judgments is of dubious value)). 
27 James M. Hoefler, Diffusion and Diversity:  Federalism and the Right to Die in 
the Fifty States, 24 PUBLIUS 153, 160 (1994) (noting the “trend in state courts to hold 
minimum levels of constitutional protections set by the U.S. Supreme Court to be 
insufficient to satisfy state standards of constitutional rights”); see also S. Candice 
Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy:  A Reconstruction of the Supremacy 
Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829, 890 (1992) (“Even in the area of civil rights, it is no 
longer apparent that federal law will afford individuals more protection than the 
laws of their states.”). 
28 Friedman, supra note 13, at 379. 
29 Id. at 384. 
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one of the most effective mechanisms for promoting federalism, 
resulting in a more responsive and robust form of democracy.30 
Furthermore, surrendering total authority to distant 
representatives not only weakens accountability but also can 
promote dishonesty.31  Allocating more power back to the state 
side of the federalism equation may address “the clear loss of 
faith in democracy many in this country feel” due to “the 
corrupting influence of interest groups and money in the 
national Congress.”32  Initiatives can be a salutary response to 
the voters’ “disenchantment”33 with corruption in government 
and satisfy federalism’s focus on more local participation. 
Finally, federalism allows states to act as laboratories.  
Centralization at the federal level can stifle innovation, with 
congressional “stasis” preventing any positive action from that 
national legislative body.34  Instead, dispersing power to the 
states encourages the evolution of ideas that can help advance an 
issue nationally.  The “evolutionary process” of “innovation” 
works best when experimentation is diffused.35  More progress is 
likely when “fifty different parallel state governments and 
countless substate governments” are working on possible 
solutions to problems that face the nation.36  Some of these ideas 
will be rejected, but the odds improve with the existence of 
multiple, creative options. 
A.  State Legislative Processes 
The traditional deliberative process for legislation from 
representatives was designed to allow gradual, rather than 
abrupt, change.  An executive, small groups of legislators, or 
sometimes a single legislator can halt the progress of laws at any 
 
30 See Scheiber, supra note 1, at 787 (praising “the tradition that finds in the 
people themselves the source of legitimacy for both constitutional foundations and 
the ongoing governance of the state polity”). 
31 See TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 25. 
32 Friedman, supra note 13, at 384. 
33 Id. at 390 (“Indeed, intuition suggests that disenchantment with government 
and anemic levels of citizen participation in democracy positively correlate with 
nationalizing trends. . . . Intuition suggests that more people would and could 
participate in smaller levels of government . . . .”). 
34 Id. at 384. 
35 Id. at 399–400. 
36 See id. at 398–400. 
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one of several pressure points throughout the process to 
encourage compromise between minority and majority views.  
Although these pressure points have advantages in many 
situations, influential minority interests sometimes can 
manipulate the process to create gridlock on controversial issues 
they oppose on moral grounds.  In contrast, laws created by 
citizen initiatives bypass these pressure points in the traditional 
legislative process.  In some cases, this lack of minority 
protection is problematic.  However, for innovative experiments 
opposed by religious minorities, the fast-food initiative process 
may be the only mechanism for allowing legislation to move 
forward. 
1.  Pressure Points in the Traditional Legislative Process 
The U.S. legislative process is notoriously inefficient.37  Based 
on James Madison’s vision to pit “factions” against one another 
to force compromise,38 the process attempts to filter out 
 
37 See id. at 388; see also id. at 388 n.301 (“[I]t is crystal clear from the records of 
the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the Framers ranked 
other values higher than efficiency.” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958–59 
(1983))); Richard D. Marks, High Technology Legislation as an Eighteenth Century 
Process, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 17, 18 (1994).  Marks notes that: 
Generalizations are risky, but it still is fair to say that the legislative process 
of the United States is designed to be inefficient in the short run.  Checks 
and balances, and the concomitant need to build political coalitions, result 
in a slower decision-making process, at least in comparison to less 
democratic forms. 
Id. 
38 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 132–33 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher 
Wright ed., 1996).  Madison wrote: 
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the 
republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views 
by regular vote.  It may clog the administration, it may convulse the 
society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the 
forms of the Constitution.  When a majority is included in a faction, the 
form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its 
ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other 
citizens.  To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of 
such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of 
popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are 
directed.  Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of 
government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so 
long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of 
mankind. 
Id. 
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extremes and bring parties toward a middle ground.39  Although 
the goal is to achieve gradual, rather than abrupt, change,40 
sometimes minority interests can exploit the process so that the 
result is gridlock instead of any progress at all on an issue. 
Pressure points throughout the legislative process permit 
minority factions to strategically assert influence to stop the flow 
of legislation.41  Individual legislators can assert pressure to 
defeat a bill by assigning it to an unreceptive committee or by 
scheduling so it never comes to a vote before the full chamber.  
In addition, the national Congress and all of the state legislatures 
but one42 are bicameral; thus a few representatives in one of the 
two separate legislative chambers can assert pressure in their 
own chamber to defeat legislation passed by the other legislative 
chamber.  Similarly, bills that successfully pass through 
committee hearings and the multiple votes of both chambers of a 
legislature still may be halted at the executive level by a 
presidential or gubernatorial veto.43 
 
39 See Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference:  Judicial 
Independence in Informal Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REV. 1, 36 n.252 (2006) 
(“By its very nature, the legislative process is one of mediation, compromise, and 
reconciliation of differing views and opinions.” (quoting Linda Galler, Emerging 
Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, B.U. L. REV. 841, 879 
(1992))). 
40 Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 722 
n.213 (2000) (“The traditional liberal justification of bicameralism is that it slows 
down the legislative process, renders abrupt change difficult, forces myopic 
legislators to have second thoughts, and thereby minimizes arbitrariness and 
injustice in governmental action.” (quoting William H. Riker, The Justification of 
Bicameralism, 13 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 101, 101 (1992))); see also Elizabeth R. 
Leong, Ballot Initiatives & Identifiable Minorities:  A Textual Call to Congress, 28 
RUTGERS L.J. 677, 685–91 (1997); Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular 
Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. 
REV. 395, 401–04 (2003). 
41 Some scholars have identified these mechanisms for filtering out undesirable 
outcomes in the legislative process as “vetogates.”  See LARRY I. PALMER, 
ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS:  LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIETY IN ASSISTED LIFE 
AND DEATH 108 (2000). 
42 Nebraska voters converted their state legislature from a bicameral to a 
unicameral system through an initiative in 1934.  History of the Nebraska 
Unicameral, www.unicam.state.ne.us/web/public/history (last visited June 4, 2007).  
Although twenty-one other states also attempted to switch to unicameral systems in 
the 1930s, these efforts failed.  Interest in unicameral legislatures revived in the 
1960s, but no state government other than Nebraska currently uses this form.  Id. 
43 See Leong, supra note 40, at 685–86.  Leong writes: 
 We are familiar with the Constitution’s fine-tuned system of 
deliberative democracy.  An initiative process would have been wholly 
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Thus, pressure-point inefficiency may contribute to more 
moderate laws in some instances, but in others, it does not work 
so tidily and can become a recipe for gridlock.44  The existence of 
these pressure points also makes legislators especially 
susceptible to party pressures and special interests.  Interest 
groups need only influence the process at one of the critical 
junctures, and progress grinds to a halt. 
2.  The Citizen Initiative Process 
Dissatisfaction with an entirely representative form of 
government reached a turning point during the Progressive era 
in the late 1800s.45  In response to intransient and corrupt 
legislatures,46 the Progressives proposed citizen initiatives as an 
 
foreign to the framers, who structured the legislative process in a 
thoroughly inefficient, though ingeniously deliberative, manner:  (1) a 
bicameral legislature expected to deliberate and pass on each proposed bill; 
(2) a Chief Executive permitted to veto all legislative enactments complete 
with his articulated reasons; and (3) the ability of both houses to override 
that veto by a supermajority vote.  The Constitution’s divided processes of 
federal legislation supply a probative model of what republican 
government is:  structural opportunities for a minority faction to alter the 
outcome or impact of a majority’s bare desire or tendency to harm. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
44 As Germany’s first chancellor, Otto Von Bismarck, famously quipped:  “Laws 
are like sausages, it is better not to see them being made.”  Tracey E. George & 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., How Is Constitutional Law Made?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 
1265 (2002) (quoting 1,911 BEST THINGS ANYBODY EVER SAID 232 (Robert Byrne 
ed., 1988)). 
45 THOMAS M. DURBIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REF. NO. 81-63A, 
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL:  A RESUME OF STATE PROVISIONS 3 
(1981).  In addition to the initiative and referendum process, the Progressive 
movement sought a number of political reforms, including secret ballots, direct 
election of U.S. senators, primary elections, and women’s suffrage.  THOMAS 
GOEBEL, A GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE:  DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
1890–1940, at 3–4 (2002).  Some also recognize the movement as that of the Populist 
party as well as the Progressives.  The Populist platform of 1892 affirmed support 
for direct legislation and the National Direct Legislation League.  TALLIAN, supra 
note 25, at 35–36. 
46 M. DANE WATERS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INITIATIVE AND 
REFERENDUM PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2003), http://www 
.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/Drop%20Down%20Boxes/Q
uick%20Facts/History%20of%20I&R.pdf; see also GOEBEL, supra note 45, at 4 
(noting that the direct democracy movement typically has been interpreted as 
response to perceived influence of special interest groups on legislatures).  In 
California, the initiative was introduced to wrest control of the state government 
from the Southern Pacific Company.  See James E. Castello, Comment, The Limits 
of Popular Sovereignty:  Using the Initiative Power to Control Legislative Procedure, 
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alternative mechanism for creating laws.47  The Progressives 
argued that initiatives could correct the control of government 
by moneyed interests48 and could force action when elected 
officials became “paralyzed by inaction.”49  Woodrow Wilson 
studied initiatives as an academic before he ran for president, 
and after initial skepticism, became an initiative convert, praising 
the process as the “gun behind the door”50 and “a sobering 
means of obtaining genuine representative action on the part of 
legislative bodies.”51 
Currently, twenty-three states allow citizen initiatives to 
create law outside of the traditional legislative process.52  The 
citizen initiative process is controversial.53  Critics have argued 
 
74 CAL. L. REV. 491, 503–04 (1986) (describing amendment of the California 
Constitution to authorize referendum and initiative immediately following election 
of reform movement’s “standard bearer” Hiram Johnson as governor). 
47 See, e.g., Beall v. State ex rel. Jenkins, 103 A. 99, 102–03 (Md. 1917) (opining 
that Maryland and other states amended their constitutions to provide for 
referendum veto of legislation in order to eliminate alleged control and corruption 
by “great corporations” and political parties); State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 181 P. 
920, 922 (Wash. 1919) (opining that citizens asserted referendum power due to 
perception that legislature had become unresponsive to popular will).  One New 
Jersey reformer concluded that “representative government is a failure.”  GOEBEL, 
supra note 45, at 36.  On another occasion, supporters of direct legislation by the 
electorate characterized representative government as an “utter failure,” stating 
that “[i]t fails in the leaders it develops; it fails in its mechanism[;] [i]t is cumbrous, 
uncertain, confused, irresponsible, undemocratic, often farcical and dishonest, and 
commonly partisan.”  Id. at 207 n.35. 
48 The Progressives also argued the initiative could “take back government from 
the special interests.”  Scheiber, supra note 1, at 790; see id. (“As Senator Jonathan 
Bourne, Jr., of Oregon declared in 1912, [the initiative was needed] ‘to restore the 
sovereignty of the people[,] [t]o educate and develop the people[,] [t]o secure 
legislation for the general welfare[,] [t]o prevent legislation against the general 
welfare[,] [t]o eliminate the legislative blackmailer[, and] [t]o make our legislative 
bodies truly representative.’” (quoting Jonathan Bourne, Jr., Functions of the 
Initiative, Referendum and Recall, 43 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 3, 3 
(1912) (alterations in original))); see also GOEBEL, supra note 45, at 4 (noting that 
the direct democracy movement is typically interpreted as response to perceived 
influence of special interest groups on legislatures); WATERS, supra note 46, at 3. 
49 WATERS, supra note 46, at 2. 
50 GOEBEL, supra note 45, at 55. 
51 Scheiber, supra note 1, at 793 (quoting Woodrow Wilson, The Issues of Reform, 
in THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 69, 88 (William Bennett Munro 
ed., 1912)). 
52 See supra note 6. 
53 For example, many authors suggest different standards for judicial review of 
initiatives than for legislative enactments.  Although it is beyond the scope of this 
Article to address judicial review of any PAD laws enacted by initiative, some 
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that initiatives produce inferior law because they do not allow 
the fine tuning produced by a trip through the traditional 
legislative process.54  This criticism is especially appropriate 
when initiatives attempt to address complex fiscal questions with 
a yes or no vote.55 
Also, initiatives are frequently maligned for allowing 
oppression of unpopular minorities.56  In the early 1900s, 
 
authors have suggested deference to initiative-made laws.  See, e.g., K.K. DuVivier, 
State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation:  A Medical Marijuana 
Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 223–27 (2005) (discussing a heightened 
presumption against preemption).  Others have argued for greater scrutiny.  See, 
e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1548–
51 (1990) (urging heightened scrutiny of laws enacted by initiatives and 
referendums); see also Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline:  
Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477, 494–504 
(creating “quasi-constitutional canons of statutory interpretation” to interpret 
direct democracy enactments); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”:  
Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 123–29 (1995) 
(criticizing judicial efforts to divine legislative intent when interpreting ballot 
measures); Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2748, 2755–57 (2005).  Yet a third group argues for no difference.  See, e.g., Eule, 
supra, at 1505 n.5 (Although Eule argues for heightened scrutiny, his work collects 
citations to Supreme Court cases recognizing popular enactment of a law at issue 
yet refusing to interpret it any differently because of the method of enactment); see 
also Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, supra, at 2760–62. 
54 See, e.g., Eule, supra note 53, at 1520, 1527, 1555; Elizabeth Garrett, Who 
Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 20 (1997); Hans A. 
Linde, On Reconstituting “Republican Government,” 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
193, 204–06 (1994) (“When groups or individuals can bypass deliberative bodies and 
enact these passions by plebiscite, the state departs from republican lawmaking.”). 
55 See, e.g., DuVivier, supra note 53, at 246 (describing the budget crisis in 
Colorado when voters passed conflicting funding initiatives); Mildred Wigfall 
Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and Local Fiscal Policy at the 
Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism:  The Property Tax as a Case in 
Point, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 511, 543 (2002); Judicial Approaches to Direct 
Democracy, supra note 53, at 2759 (“[I]ts myopic focus creates difficulty for a 
legislature that is responsible for taking a more holistic view of the state’s fiscal 
responsibilities.”); id. (also noting that California’s Proposition 13 “wreak[ed] havoc 
[on] state finances” and the “three strikes” criminal law had fiscal implications 
because of the larger prison population). 
56 Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
245, 245–46 (1997) (finding empirically that initiatives that restrict civil rights have 
been approved seventy-five percent of the time in contrast to the approximate 
thirty-three percent approval success of all initiatives historically); see also Lynn A. 
Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination:  A Public Choice Perspective, 67 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 712–15 (1992); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum:  
Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–9 (1978); Sherman 
J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434, 473–75 
(1998); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican 
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initiatives were used to disenfranchise African American citizens 
in the South and to restrict the ability of Asian Americans to 
hold land in California.57  Recent initiatives attempting to restrict 
gay rights and denying services to illegal immigrants perpetuate 
the initiative’s ugly legacy in this area.58  Fortunately, many 
initiatives that attempted to infringe civil rights have been 
defeated,59 and among those that have been enacted, many have 
 
Government”:  The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 34–37 
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 150–57 (1983); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial 
Review of Initiatives and Referendums in Which Majorities Vote on Minorities’ 
Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 421–25 (1999); Priscilla F. Gunn, 
Note, Initiatives and Referendums:  Direct Democracy and Minority Interests, 22 
URB. L. ANN. 135, 158 (1981).  But cf. Ronald J. Allen, The National Initiative 
Proposal:  A Preliminary Analysis, 58 NEB. L. REV. 965, 1021 (1979) (noting that 
“[t]he history of the initiative is remarkably free of the enactment of abusive 
legislation”). 
57 See Scheiber, supra note 1, at 795 (discussing California’s Alien Land Law, 
Proposition 1, in 1920); see also Janice C. May, The Constitutional Initiative:  A 
Threat to Rights?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES 163, 171–72 (Stanley H. 
Friedelbaum ed., 1988). 
58 For example, California’s Proposition 187 attempted to cut services for illegal 
aliens, but was declared unconstitutional or preempted by federal law in League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786–87 (C.D. Cal. 
1995).  A similar measure was passed in Arizona in 2004.  Proposition 200 passed by 
a margin of fifty-six percent.  Richard Marosi, Anti-Immigrant Initiatives Growing, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at A13.  Another was proposed for Colorado in 2006.  
Proposed Initiative No. 55 failed to make it on the ballot when the Colorado 
Supreme Court determined that it did not meet the requirements of the single 
subject rule.  Sarah Burnett, “We’re Not Giving Up” Initiative Activist Says, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 13, 2006, at 13A.  In 2000, California Proposition 22 sought 
to keep gay and lesbian couples from marrying in other states and seeking 
recognition of the union in California.  Evelyn Nieves, Ballot Initiative That Would 
Thwart Gay Marriage Is Embroiling California, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2000, at A12. 
59 AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE:  WHAT THE 
CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 38 (1998).  One of the 
authors has stated: 
Indeed, a tiny percentage of proposed initiatives are aimed at restricting 
civil rights, and most of these are defeated.  Citizens have used direct 
democracy less to oppress vulnerable minorities than to (i) reform 
government processes through campaign finance laws, restrictions on 
lobbying, and conflict of interest statutes, (ii) restrict their tax burden, and 
(iii) protect the environment. 
DuVivier, supra note 53, at 243 n.110 (quoting Alan Hirsch, Direct Democracy and 
Civic Maturation, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 206–07 n.110 (2002) (citations 
omitted)). 
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been invalidated by the courts.60  Furthermore, the traditional 
legislative process can result in similar oppression, and there is 
evidence that legislation enacted through “the deliberative 
process does not systematically create fewer discriminatory 
laws.”61 
The initiative process has many detractors, and even those 
who appreciate its advantages acknowledge that its use has been 
problematic in some situations.62  Despite the criticism, the 
initiative process is wildly popular with voters.  During the 1981 
to 1990 decade, U.S. voters placed a record 274 initiatives and 
referendums on state ballots nationwide.  The following decade, 
the number rose to another record of 391 statewide measures.63  
The upward trend appears to be continuing with more initiatives 
on state ballots every year.64  Furthermore, the relatively few 
initiatives that may have tainted the process for some should not 
 
60 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (1992); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 
(1996) (finding that an initiative passed by Colorado voters in 1992, known as 
Amendment 2, which invalidated antidiscrimination protections on the basis of 
sexual orientation enacted by local governments, violated Equal Protection). 
61 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 243. 
62 It fosters reactions of “serious concern to outright disillusionment, and 
oftentimes sheer despair.”  Scheiber, supra note 1, at 789.  However, it also “play[s] 
a positive role in increasing electoral participation” and “has become a preferred 
mechanism of governing . . . the state’s most important policies.”  Caroline J. 
Tolbert et al., The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout in the American 
States, 29 AM. POL. RES. 625, 625 (2001); see also DuVivier, supra note 53, at 221–
23, 235–48. 
63 Overview of Initiative Use, 1904–2006, INITIATIVE USE (Initiative & 
Referendum Inst., L.A., Cal.), Nov. 2002, at 1, 2, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/ 
IRI%20Initiative%20Use%20(2006-11).pdf.  The resurgence of the initiative 
process, after a decline in the 1940s through 1960s, is often credited to California’s 
Proposition 13.  Jim Wasserman, Tax-Cutting Proposition 13 Sparked Revolt, 
DENVER POST, June 2, 2003, at 6A.  In a February 2003 poll by the Public Policy 
Institute of California, sixty-five percent of homeowners say the proposition was 
“mostly a good thing for California.”  MARK BALDASSARE, PUB. POL. INST. OF 
CAL., PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY:  CALIFORNIANS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 10 
(2003), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/survey/S_203MBS.pdf. 
64 A total of 204 measures appeared on the ballots of thirty-seven states during 
the 2006 midterm elections, an increase from the 162 measures on ballots during the 
2004 election.  Election Results 2006, BALLOT WATCH (Initiative & Referendum 
Inst., L.A., Cal.), Nov. 2006, at 1, 1, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202006-
5%20(Election%20results-update).pdf.  “A total of 2,231 state-level initiatives have 
been on the ballot since the first one went before the voters in Oregon in 1904, and 
909 (41 percent) have been approved.”  Overview of Initiative Use, supra note 63, at 
1.  See generally, K.K. DuVivier, Out of the Bottle:  The Genie of Direct Democracy, 
70 ALB. L. REV. 1045 (2007) (describing the popularity of initiatives and the spread 
of their use to influence candidate elections). 
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serve to render initiatives “categorically suspect.”65  Instead, it is 
valuable to consider the positive role initiatives have played in 
the past and still can play in the context of federalism. 
B.  The Benefit of Fast-Food Initiatives for Innovation 
One of the biggest advantages of citizen initiatives is that they 
avoid many of the deficiencies of the legislative process.  Few 
would want to eat at McDonalds all the time, but in some 
situations, fast food may be the best option.  Similarly, fast-food 
government is a mechanism for the people to get action when 
legislatures are unwilling to respond for social or political 
reasons.  As Theodore Roosevelt noted:  “I believe in the 
initiative and referendum, which should be used not to destroy 
representative government, but to correct it whenever it 
becomes misrepresentative.”66 
Legislators personally benefit from infusions of additional 
money to their campaigns, so they have an incentive to appease 
large campaign contributors.67  Furthermore, legislators cannot 
always vote their personal convictions on legislation without fear 
of repercussions for voting against party lines.68  Consequently, 
sophisticated donors need only make contributions to party 
leaders and strategic legislators to manipulate the pressure 
points in the traditional process and improve their odds for 
favorable legislative outcomes. 
In contrast, the initiative process was designed specifically to 
address the problems with representative governments that have 
stalled.  While initiatives may suffer from some of the same 
shortcomings as the legislative process,69 they are less susceptible 
 
65 Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, supra note 53, at 2765–66. 
66 Theodore Roosevelt, A Charter of Democracy, Address Before the Ohio 
Constitutional Convention (Feb. 12, 1912), in POLITICS AND PEOPLE:  THE 
ORDEAL OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 180 (Leon Sein et al. eds., 1974). 
67 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 245–46. 
68 Id. at 247; see also AMAR & HIRSCH, supra note 59, at 39. 
69 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 240–48; see also BETTY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA, 
AND THE GRASS ROOTS 108–09 (1987); DuVivier, supra note 64, at 1048 n.15; 
Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
1845, 1849 (1999); Clayton P. Gillette, Is Direct Democracy Anti-Democratic?, 34 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 609, 622–24 (1998); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign 
Spending and Ballot Propositions:  Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the 
First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 517–19 (1982); Randy M. Mastro et al., 
Taking the Initiative:  Corporate Control of the Referendum Process Through Media 
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to special interest manipulation of the pressure points.  
Individual voters do not need to respond to pressure from party 
leaders because they may vote by secret ballot and will not suffer 
any personal consequences for voting contrary to the party line.70 
Similarly, initiatives are no more corrupted by the influence of 
money than the traditional legislative process.  Minority interest 
contributors are more likely to see a direct return for their 
donations to legislators whose tenure in office may ride on a 
campaign contribution.  In contrast, voters receive no direct 
financial benefit by choosing for one side or another, so they are 
more likely to vote their consciences on an initiative.71  Because 
most citizens are motivated by good intentions rather than 
greed, “big money can kill a ballot measure[;] [b]ut the 
corresponding good news is that big money can’t always buy a 
‘yes’ vote.”72 
Trust in the “power of the people”73 as an alternative to 
representative government sparked the resurgence of direct 
democracy in the late 1960s.  For example, the People’s Lobby, a 
grassroots group, “resurrected and energized California’s 
previously moribund direct-democracy laws” initially in an 
attempt to recall Ronald Reagan, then governor of California.74  
 
Spending and What to Do About It, 32 FED. COMM. L.J. 315, 319–23 (1980); John S. 
Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts:  Can Corruption, 
Undue Influence, and Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
377, 391–400 (1985). 
70 TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 29 (quoting John R. Haynes, The Actual Workings 
of the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall, 1 NAT’L MUN. REV. 586, 589 (1912)).  The 
father of the recall in California worked to get direct democracy in Los Angeles and 
then the state twenty-four years before the election of Governor Hiram Johnson 
and other representatives sympathetic to the cause who enacted statewide direct 
democracy in California in 1910.  Id. at 36–38 (“[T]he ordinary legislator often votes 
upon scores of questions at a single sitting, amid tumult and uproar, the appeal to 
party passion, and to his private pocketbook.” (quoting Haynes, supra, at 586)). 
71 The desire to vote their consciences also may have a downside on repressive 
moral issues; despite contributions by gay-rights activists, voters in eight of nine 
states approved same-sex marriage bans in 2006.  Karen E. Crummy, A Big Role in 
a Fight to Help Gays Wed, DENVER POST, Aug. 7, 2007, at 1B.  In contrast, these 
activists noted that their contributions helped elect “a number of state lawmakers 
who support gay rights . . . and some are changing laws.”  Id. 
72 Al Knight, Do Initiatives Still Work?  Yes, but They Need Some Repair, 
DENVER POST, Dec. 1, 2002, at 1E; see also DuVivier, supra note 64, at 1048–49. 
73 TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 118. 
74 Matt Smith, Recalling Reagan, SFWEEKLY.COM, Aug. 27, 2003, 
http://www.sfweekly.com/2003-08-27/news/recalling-reagan. 
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The initiative process inspired these individuals to eschew more 
futile, and potentially destructive, methods of impacting 
government policies and instead provided a constructive 
mechanism for those who felt disempowered to seek political 
change.75  Without initiatives, the influential “triumphed without 
even the need publicly to justify their views.”76  Now both the 
right and the left recognize the power of the initiative to 
motivate and achieve results, as both the state and local initiative 
processes have enjoyed record popularity during the last thirty 
years.77 
Fast food is not healthy as daily fare, but it can work well as 
part of a complete diet.  Similarly, direct democracy is best not 
for circumventing legislatures, but instead as a supplemental 
means of addressing a “fail[ure] in [the] mechanism.”78  Citizens 
may be allowed to “recogniz[e] legislators as specialists in 
government,” and yet “join in partnership with them to 
supplement their work” by registering their preferences not only 
during representative elections, but between them.79 
Federalism encourages the diffusion of power, and the 
initiative process illustrates the advantage of this diffusion.  The 
Supreme Court continues to endorse Justice Brandeis’s assertion 
that “one of the happy incidents of the federal system” is 
allowing a state to “serve as a laboratory[] and try novel . . . 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”80  History 
 
75 See TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 117 (noting that more than boycotts and 
protest, the “initiative surpasses all other political methods to bring an issue into 
sharp focus”). 
76 Id. at 118. 
77 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 235.  Although initiatives were initially promoted 
by Progressives in the late 1800s and by liberal groups in the late 1960s, they are 
now embraced by liberals and conservatives and do not “promote any particular 
agenda over another.”  Id. 
78 Representative government “‘fails in the leaders it develops; it fails in its 
mechanism.  It is cumbrous, uncertain, confused, irresponsible, undemocratic, often 
farcical and dishonest, and commonly partisan.’”  GOEBEL, supra note 45, at 206 
n.35 (quoting NAT’L DIRECT LEGISLATION LEAGUE, DIRECT LEGISLATION 
RECORD I, at 84 (1894)). 
79 TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 8. 
80 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting), cited in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting), Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 326 (2002), United States v. Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 502 (2001) (Stevens, J. dissenting), Smith v. 
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 261 (2000); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 
261, 292 (1990). 
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has shown that citizen initiatives are some of the best vehicles 
for this dispersed experimentation by states. 
1.  Local Legislative Experimentation 
The division of power between national and local authority in 
the U.S. Constitution was designed to secure the “people’s 
rights.”81  This division of power favors local authority to address 
experimental issues for at least three reasons. 
First, communities themselves, not the federal government, 
should have the power to resolve important local issues that do 
not impact other states.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
recognizing one of the benefits of citizen initiatives, “a 
decentralized government . . . will be more sensitive to the 
diverse needs of a heterogeneous society.”82 
Second, allowing state social experimentation sometimes can 
result in a national consensus where none previously existed.  
The state efforts can signal to Congress that there is widespread 
support for a particular measure or, just as importantly, 
widespread opposition. 
Third, federal control in experimental areas can eliminate any 
potential for progress or the resolution of differing views.  
Because federal law preempts, “the state is powerless to remove 
the ill effects of [a federal] decision.”83  When the U.S. 
Constitution or a federal statute speaks on a topic, alternative 
state approaches may be curtailed, preventing them from 
contributing to a compromise resolution on a controversial topic 
that might better reflect a consensus of opinions.84 
 
81 Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 647 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) 
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000)) (arguing that 
federal regulation in the area of medical marijuana use is inappropriate under basic 
principles of federalism and is best left to the states). 
82 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that a decentralized 
government “increases [the] opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic 
processes”). 
83 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 643 (1973) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Pa. Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm’n, 318 
U.S. 261, 275 (1943)).  In contrast, if Congress is unhappy with a court’s finding that 
state law may stand, it can enact new legislation because “’the national government, 
which has the ultimate power, remains free to remove the burden.’”  Id. at 643 
(quoting Pa. Dairies, Inc., 318 U.S. at 275). 
84 See generally DuVivier, supra note 53 (describing Attorney General Ashcroft’s 
efforts to use the federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2000), 
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Many innovations arise at the state level in a manner “akin to 
natural selection.”85  State legislators are forced into 
experimentation by necessity because they are faced with 
difficult issues, and “the spirit of state experimentation is one of 
creative response to immediate necessity, often addressed to 
solving a real problem staring the official in the face.”86 
Some scholars credit state governments with innovations in 
welfare reform, social security, unemployment compensation, 
minimum-wage laws, public financing of political campaigns, no-
fault insurance, hospital cost containment, and prohibitions 
against discrimination in housing and employment.87  Others also 
say state experiments at the local level led the way in public 
education, health care, taxation, penology, and environmental 
protection.88  One scholar surmised that “[c]ommon intuition 
suggests that the vast majority of techniques used today to 
govern were developed at the state and local level.”89 
Yet, critics have argued that states are not effective 
laboratories for experimentation because state legislators are 
risk averse.  Legislators do not want to commit resources to an 
experiment that may prove unpopular or costly.90  State 
legislators, instead, have an incentive to support the status quo 
and “free ride on the activities of other governments.”91 
 
to preempt Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, described in this Article at notes 319–
23 and accompanying text). 
85 Deborah J. Merritt, Federalism as Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 541, 551 
(1995); see also Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. 
& POL. 1, 31 (2006) (“Well, if the fifty states are laboratories for public policy 
formation, then surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities provide 
logarithmically more opportunities for innovation . . . .”). 
86 Friedman, supra note 13, at 398. 
87 See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:  
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1988) (identifying four 
advantages of federalism:  checks on the central government, greater accessibility, 
diversity, and enhanced opportunities for experimentation); Michael W. 
McConnell, Federalism:  Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 
1491–1511 (1987) (book review) (arguing that federalism secures the public good, 
protects private rights, and preserves the spirit and form of popular governments). 
88 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM:  A DIALOGUE 87–88 (1995). 
89 Friedman, supra note 13, at 399. 
90 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection:  Does Federalism 
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980) (“[L]ow-level governments 
remain flawed mechanisms to rely on in the search for new ideas.”). 
91 Id. (“[S]ecure incumbents are likely to behave as if they were ‘risk averse’ even 
if their underlying preferences are risk neutral.  In a multiple government system 
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Most local legislators especially prefer to avoid confronting 
matters of social experimentation.  The pressure-point structure 
of traditional legislation permits a few vested representatives to 
kill controversial bills, allowing other legislators to avoid taking 
a stand.92 
2.  The History of Initiatives for Innovation 
While federal and state legislators have an incentive to be 
fiscally and issue conservative to guarantee reelection, citizen 
voters do not have these concerns.  Citizen voters, who are not 
motivated by a desire to be reelected, are more likely to “vote 
their conscience.”93  Furthermore, citizen votes on many 
experimental measures are more likely to be well considered and 
less likely to be influenced by outside sources when these 
measures have the potential to impact voters or their immediate 
acquaintances locally.94  Because these local voters are less 
 
the overall incentive to take risks is reduced if the politician hopes to free ride on 
the activities of other governments.”). 
92 SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 33–34.  Schmidt notes: 
There are several ways to kill a bill that allow legislators to avoid answering 
to the electorate–politicians are very creative in this regard.  The New 
Jersey state senate in 1981 and 1983 passed bills nearly unanimously to 
amend the state constitution to provide for a statewide Initiative process.  
Many of the legislators actually opposed Initiative, but voted for it because 
they knew that it would be blocked in an assembly committee.  This 
arrangement allowed the senators to report to constituents that they had 
voted for Initiative, and allowed the assembly members–with the 
exception of the handful who voted to block I&R in committee–to report 
to constituents that they too favored I&R, but did not get a chance to vote 
on it. 
Id.; see, e.g., Erik Bailey, Action on “Right to Die” Languishes in California, L.A. 
TIMES, June 27, 1997, at A12 (“But from a political standpoint, as we saw with 
Proposition 161, [PAD is] a difficult issue to address.” (quoting Assemblyman Bob 
Hertzberg)). 
93 See INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., GENERAL ELECTION POST ELECTION 
REPORT 1 (2002), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/ 
Drop%20Down%20Boxes/Election%20Reports/2002%20General%20Election/200
2%20POST-election%20Report%20-%2012-11-02%20-%20State%20by%20State 
.pdf. 
94 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 248 (arguing that initiatives having the following 
qualities are the best candidates for initiative resolution:  “Such initiatives represent 
an alignment of factors:  (a) topic areas that have traditionally been regulated by 
the states, such as health and safety; (b) good candidates for experimentation at the 
state level when there is no need for national uniformity; and (c) matters that 
expand the rights of individuals without infringing on the rights of others.”). 
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influenced by the pressure points that snag controversial issues 
in the traditional legislative process, fast-food government by 
initiative has often been the first, if not the only, way that 
innovative concepts find their way into law. 
Historically, many significant innovations have been achieved 
through, or with the help of, the initiative.  In contrast to elected 
legislators who fear repercussions, citizens have traditionally 
embraced the initiative mechanism for experimentation on 
important social issues, especially social issues that are 
particularly controversial and can have a difficult time 
surmounting the legislative process.95  The Progressives sought 
to address the “intransigence” and “lack of integrity of elected 
legislators” through “public participation in the lawmaking 
process,” and their expectations were largely vindicated.96  A few 
of the areas in which initiatives have been most beneficial are 
reform of government itself, social reforms, civil rights, and 
protection of the environment. 
Reform of Government:  More initiatives have addressed 
government reform than any other single category.97  This is an 
especially appropriate area for citizen participation because 
legislators who benefit from the status quo98 are reluctant to 
legislate change.99  Many of the early reforms proposed by the 
Progressives related to government reform, and early initiatives 
succeeded in establishing (1) nominations of candidates through 
 
95 Judith F. Daar, Direct Democracy and Bioethical Choices:  Voting Life and 
Death at the Ballot Box, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 799, 830 (arguing voter-made 
lawmaking is inherently more beneficial to reform than representative lawmaking). 
96 Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, supra note 53, at 2763. 
97 See, e.g., SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 21; see also Judicial Approaches to Direct 
Democracy, supra note 53, at 2764 (“Of all the initiatives placed on statewide 
ballots in the last half of the twentieth century, nearly one in four addressed the 
administration of government, whether in the legislative branch, in state agencies 
and administrations, in the electoral or apportionment processes, or in the very 
processes of direct democracy.”). 
98 “Just as scholars have advocated an enhanced judicial role when ‘the ins are 
choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the 
outs will stay out,’ so too can direct democracy promote more responsive and 
representative government . . . .”  Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, supra 
note 53, at 2765 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 
(1980)).  So too can direct democracy promote more responsive and representative 
government in such situations.  Id. 
99 See Baker, supra note 8, at 320–21; Clark, supra note 8, at 347. 
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primary elections,100 (2) presidential primaries,101 (3) direct 
election of U.S. senators,102 and (4) home rule of cities.103  Fair 
reapportionment has often been a topic for initiatives, and 
Arizona citizens blazed the way by passing a measure in 1912 
requiring a population-based formula more than “half a century 
before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled this method of 
reapportionment mandatory.”104  Well-meaning, if sometimes 
problematic, initiative efforts to clean up government more 
recently have included (1) term limits,105 (2) campaign finance 
reform,106 and (3) limits on lobbying contributions.107 
Social reforms:  Early initiatives promoted several social 
reforms long before the New Deal, including (1) the eight-hour 
work day,108 (2) a ban on child labor,109 and (3) government aid 
programs for farmers, the poor, the disabled, and the elderly.110  
The 2006 elections continued to illustrate the initiative’s 
advantage in this category as six states passed initiative measures 
increasing the minimum wage for hourly workers.111 
Civil Rights:  Women’s suffrage was a key cause for the 
Progressives.  Successful initiatives in Arizona and Oregon 
“helped prepare the way for passage of the national suffrage 
amendment nine years later.”112  Early initiatives also (1) banned 
poll taxes113 and (2) established a juvenile court system.114  At 
least one author has speculated that the issue of slavery could 
 
100 SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 15 (Arkansas, Maine, Montana, Oregon, and South 
Dakota). 
101 Id. (Montana and Oregon). 
102 Id. (Oregon, Montana, and Oklahoma). 
103 Id. (Colorado and Oregon). 
104 Id. 
105 See WATERS, supra note 64, at 6. 
106 See id. 
107 See DuVivier, supra note 64, at 1050 (discussing Colorado Amendment 41 
attempting to achieve high ethical standards and transparency in government). 
108 SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 18 (Colorado). 
109 Id. (Arkansas). 
110 Id. at 19. 
111 Election Results 2006, supra note 64, at 1; see also DuVivier, supra note 64, at 
1050 n.27. 
112 SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 19. 
113 Id. (California, Oregon, and Washington). 
114 Id. (Colorado). 
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have been resolved, and the Civil War averted, if the Senate had 
passed a proposal to put the matter to a vote of the people.115 
Environment:  Initiatives also have played a vital role in 
helping citizens take stands against business interests to protect 
the environment.  Oregon sponsored the first successful 
conservation initiative in 1910, banning the use of destructive 
fish-harvesting techniques.116  Since that time, initiatives have 
addressed topics such as:  (1) establishing fish and game 
commissions,117 (2) coastal protection,118 (3) animal rights,119 and 
(4) the use of renewable energy by utility companies.120 
 
115 See TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 7.  On January 3, 1861, Senator Crittenden 
proposed “‘taking the sense of the people and submitting to their vote . . . [the] 
Constitutional amendments to solve the slavery question by compromise.’”  Id. 
(quoting CHARLES SUMNER LOBRINGIER, THE PEOPLE’S LAW 299 (1909)).  
Senator Crittenden’s proposal was defeated in the Senate by one vote, and the Civil 
War began one month later.  Id.  Another author has suggested that: 
 Had the United States had a national Initiative process in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, the course of the Vietnam War and protests against it 
might have been different.  The Initiative process is effective not only in 
venting popular discontent, but in channeling it constructively to make the 
necessary changes. 
SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 29. 
116 SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 20. 
117 Id. (during the 1930s and 1940s in Arkansas, Idaho, Montana, and 
Washington). 
118 See, e.g., Proposition O:  Citizens Oversight Advisory Committee (COAC), 
http://www.lapropo.org/sitefiles/coac.htm (last visited July 30, 2007).  California 
Proposition O passed in 2006 and provides: 
$500 million in bond measure funds to clean up the City’s rivers, lakes, 
beaches, and ocean.  The language of Proposition O includes provisions for 
the establishment of a Citizens Oversight Advisory Committee (COAC) 
that is [to] be responsible for monitoring the bond program, projects, 
budgets and schedules and to advise and report to the Mayor and the Los 
Angeles City Council on its status. 
Id. 
119 For example, in 2006 Arizona Proposition 204 provided for a minimum living 
space for pregnant pigs and calves.  JAN BREWER, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2006 
BALLOT PROPOSITION GUIDE 134 (2006), available at http://www.azsos.gov/ 
election/2006/Info/PubPamphlet/english/Prop204.pdf#page=21. 
120 See, e.g., BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CTR., 2004 ELECTION RESULTS:  
BALLOT INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM 18–19, 23 (2004), available at 
http://www.ballot.org/vertical/Sites/{26C6ABED-7A22-4B17-A84A-
CB72F7D15E3F}/uploads/{82C8AB19-CA41-4A88-A59E-41DCC6C29D4B}.pdf 
(noting the passage of Colorado Amendment No. 37 that would require public 
utilities to derive ten percent of their electricity from alternative resources). 
 One of the primary goals of Ed Koupal’s groups, the People’s Lobby and the 
Western Bloc, which resurrected the initiative process in the late 1960s, was a 
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This list illustrates that the citizen initiative has been a 
particularly effective tool in the arsenal for effecting change.  In 
fact, the reputation for innovative lawmaking at the state level is 
perhaps more attributable to initiative-made law than to any 
actions by state legislators.121  Because they do not have to pass 
through the pressure points of the traditional legislative process, 
the fast-food quality of citizen initiatives makes them distinct 
from legislative enactments and especially effective for reform. 
3.  Initiatives for Moral Issues 
Morality has long been a driving force in the initiative 
movement.  Prohibitionists joined forces with those who lobbied 
for the initiative power hoping the direct vote would help them 
legislate against the use of alcohol.122  Yet every early 
proposition in California that attempted to prohibit alcohol or 
regulate liquor failed,123 and the Eighteenth Amendment was 
ratified by state legislatures, not by the people.124  Other moral 
issues have been the focus of initiatives, often showing back-and-
forth swings between competing majorities such as prohibiting or 
legalizing fights125 and gambling.126  Some of the most recent 
 
nationwide attempt to use initiatives to freeze the advance of nuclear power.  See 
TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 113–14.  Most of the nuclear freeze initiatives failed to 
pass, but the initiative attention to the issue was effective:  1979 was the last year a 
new nuclear plant was approved in the United States.  See, e.g., Michael V. 
Copeland, Digging the Nuclear Future, BUSINESS 2.0, Aug. 2007, at 84, 85. 
121 Cf. supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
122 GOEBEL, supra note 45, at 77–79 (noting that “the prohibition movement” 
joined organized labor and “the single taxers” as “another key ally of direct 
democracy advocates”). 
123 See, e.g., TALLIAN, supra note 25, at 173, 176–78 (noting the failures of 
California Propositions 2 (1914), 1 (1916), and 1 & 22 (1918)). 
124 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).  In contrast, Amendment XXI 
repealing Prohibition is the only Constitutional amendment ratified by 
constitutional conventions of the people instead of by state legislatures.  See DAVID 
E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 162 (1979). 
125 Compare California Prop. 20 (1914), SEC’Y OF STATE, AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION AND PROPOSED STATUTES 95 (1914), available at 
http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1914g.pdf (prohibiting prize fighting and 
boxing), with California Prop. 7 (1924), FRANK C. JORDAN, SEC’Y OF STATE, 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION AND PROPOSED STATUTES 9 (1924), 
available at http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1924g.pdf (legalizing boxing and 
wrestling contests for prizes). 
126 See, e.g., BILL JONES, SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA VOTER INFORMATION 
GUIDE 20 (1998), available at http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1998g.pdf 
(discussing California Prop. 5 allowing federally recognized Indian tribes to operate 
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moral battles being fought by initiative are the legalization of 
medical marijuana,127 gay rights,128 abortion rights,129 and stem 
cell research.130 
Failure to resolve these moral issues is especially troubling 
when efforts to expand the rights of individuals to make their 
own moral decisions are thwarted by an influential minority 
simply on the basis that the exercise of this right offends the 
beliefs or sensibilities of the minority group.  Although some of 
the other moral dilemmas currently subject to initiative battles 
arguably infringe the rights of one group or another,131 the right 
to request medical assistance in hastening one’s death is the 
quintessential example of a right to self-determination. 
This Article focuses on the advantages of the initiative process 
in federalism rather than on the substance of initiative issues that 
are the best candidates for allowing citizens to determine “what 
 
high stakes casinos and establish additional casinos without state legislature 
approval); Press Release, Sam Reed, Wash. Sec’y of State, Initiative 892 Qualifies 
for 2004 General Ballot (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.secstate.wa.gov/office/ 
osos_news.aspx?i=jeDvwiNAVQX7HqlwWP1%2FRg%3D%3D (discussing  
Washington Initiative 824, an effort to legalize slot machines). 
127 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 222–24. 
128 For example, Colorado Amendment 2 (1992), Arkansas Amendment 3 (2004), 
Georgia Amendment 1 (2004), Kentucky Amendment 1 (2004), Michigan Proposal 
04-2 (2004), Mississippi Amendment 1 (2004), Montana Initiative 96 (2004), North 
Dakota  Measure 1 (2004), Ohio Issue 1 (2004), Oklahoma Question 711 (2004), 
Oregon Measure 36 (2004), and Utah Amendment 3 (2004) all prohibited same-sex 
marriages.  See Election 2004–Ballot Measures, CNN.COM, Nov. 3, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ballot.measures/. 
129 CHRIS NELSON, S.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, SOUTH DAKOTA 2006 BALLOT 
QUESTIONS 12 (2006), available at http://www.sdsos.gov/electionsvoteregistration/ 
electvoterpdfs/2006southdakotaballotquestionpamphlet.pdf (describing Referred 
Law 6). 
130 See, e.g., CAL. ATTORNEY GEN., PROPOSITION 71:  OFFICIAL TITLE AND 
SUMMARY 68 (2004), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov04/ 
prop_71_entire.pdf; ROBYN CARNAHAN, MO. SEC’Y OF STATE,  2006 BALLOT 
MEASURE:  CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 2 (2006), http://www.sos.mo.gov/ 
elections/2006petitions/ppStemCell.asp; see also Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as 
Innovation System Laboratories:  California, Patents, and Stem Cell Technology, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV 1133, 1193–1207 (2006) (discussing California as a laboratory for 
stem cell technology). 
131 For example, a woman’s right to choose to control her own body by having an 
abortion under some religious theories interferes with the unborn child’s right to be 
brought to full term.  Also, the right to use medical marijuana to relieve pain may 
impact the right of others to live in a society free from the negative impacts of the 
criminal use of the drug. 
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serves the public interest.”132  However, the physician-assisted 
death issue represents an alignment of the three factors for 
controversial issues that might best be resolved by initiative.133  
The first factor is a straightforward and logical topic.  PAD 
concerns health and safety, topic areas that have traditionally 
been regulated by the states.  In addition, every individual must 
face death, so the matter is not only a local one; it is deeply 
personal.  Finally, the topic is not overly complex, and most 
voters understand it and will consider its consequences carefully 
as it could potentially affect each one of them.  The second 
factor is no infringement on minority rights.  PAD expands the 
rights of individuals who choose to exercise the right and does 
not impact the rights of others to hold whatever religious beliefs 
they wish.134  The third factor is no need for national uniformity.  
The Supreme Court itself has stated that there is no need for 
uniformity and that PAD is a good candidate for 
experimentation at the state level.135 
Arguably, legislatures should be the better forums for 
resolving the PAD moral battle.  The legislative process is 
tailored to sculpt compromises respecting both majority and 
minority views.  Unfortunately, however, legislatures have been 
 
132 City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 678 (1976) (noting that it 
is appropriate for voters to use “‘their traditional right through direct legislation to 
override the views of their elected representatives as to what serves the public 
interest’” (quoting S. Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 
F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970))).  Yet in the PAD debate, the people are not 
overriding their representatives’ views; instead they are trying to get action when 
the representatives have failed to express a view.  The Eastlake Court noted that 
when the people exercised their direct vote, they were exercising “a power reserved 
by the people to themselves.”  Id. at 675. 
133 DuVivier, supra note 53, at 248.  Some of the justifications for eliminating 
“criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations” of homosexuals might be 
comparable in the PAD context:  assisted suicide statutes (1) penalize conduct 
many doctors engage in; (2) regulate conduct not harmful to others; and (3) are 
arbitrarily enforced.  Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003); see also Diana 
Hassel, Sex and Death:  Lawrence’s Liberty and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 9 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 1003, 1046–48 (2007). 
134 Some opponents argue that legalizing PAD may hurt society by giving doctors 
the power to make life and death decisions.  Yet, doctors already have this power 
because the Supreme Court has declared that individuals have a constitutional right 
to refuse medical treatment.  See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Heath, 497 U.S. 261, 
265–69 (1990).  This right to make a life or death decision for an incompetent 
patient gives doctors more power than they would exercise by simply writing a 
prescription for a mentally competent patient who is contemplating death. 
135 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 287–91 (2006). 
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especially inept at addressing this controversial issue.  
Legislators’ own deeply held personal beliefs that may conflict 
with the majority of their constituents or fear of igniting the ire 
of minority interests who hold such fervent beliefs has mired this 
topic in the pressure points and stalled all legislation on the 
issue. 
II 
FEDERALISM IN THE PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH DEBATE 
Freshly minted doctors cannot leave medical school without 
first taking the Hippocratic Oath, which binds them to prescribe 
regimens for the good of their patients according to their ability 
and judgment and to never do harm to anyone.136  While the 
 
136 See ROBERT M. VEATCH, MEDICAL ETHICS 7 (2d ed. 1997).  “The 
Hippocratic Oath is often acknowledged by both physicians and lay people to be 
the foundation of medical ethics for physicians . . . .”  Id. at 6.  The oath emerged in 
the fifth century B.C. and is “traced to a group of physicians in ancient Greece . . . 
[headed by] Hippocrates, but surely not all the writings were . . . authored by him.”  
Id.  Although there are many translations and modified modern version, here is one 
translation of the original Greek: 
 I swear by Apollo the physician, and Asclepius, and Hygieia and 
Panacea and all the gods and goddesses as my witnesses, that, according to 
my ability and judgement, I will keep this Oath and this contract: 
 To hold him who taught me this art equally dear to me as my parents, to 
be a partner in life with him, and to fulfill his needs when required; to look 
upon his offspring as equals to my own siblings, and to teach them this art, 
if they shall wish to learn it, without fee or contract; and that by the set 
rules, lectures, and every other mode of instruction, I will impart a 
knowledge of the art to my own sons, and those of my teachers, and to 
students bound by this contract and having sworn this Oath to the law of 
medicine, but to no others. 
 I will use those dietary regimens which will benefit my patients 
according to my greatest ability and judgement, and I will do no harm or 
injustice to them. 
 I will not give a lethal drug to anyone if I am asked, nor will I advise 
such a plan; and similarly I will not give a woman a pessary to cause an 
abortion. 
 In purity and according to divine law will I carry out my life and my art. 
 I will not use the knife, even upon those suffering from stones, but I will 
leave this to those who are trained in this craft. 
 Into whatever homes I go, I will enter them for the benefit of the sick, 
avoiding any voluntary act of impropriety or corruption, including the 
seduction of women or men, whether they are free men or slaves. 
 Whatever I see or hear in the lives of my patients, whether in 
connection with my professional practice or not, which ought not to be 
spoken of outside, I will keep secret, as considering all such things to be 
private. 
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obligation to do both good and no harm to patients may have 
seemed consistent in the past, modern medicine has created a 
tension about when and how to stop in the case of seriously ill 
people who want to die.137 
In 2003, over 35.9 million Americans were age sixty-five or 
older.138  Experts project that this number will almost double by 
2030.139  A major reason for this rapid growth is the miracle of 
modern medicine.  Life expectancy in 1900 was 47.3 years.140  In 
contrast, the average American in 2000 could expect to live until 
the ripe age of 76.9.141 
Unfortunately, the same medical advances that have helped 
extend life sometimes also extend death, creating a “twilight 
zone of suspended animation”142 that draws out the hardship for 
 
 So long as I maintain this Oath faithfully and without corruption, may it 
be granted to me to partake of life fully and the practice of my art, gaining 
the respect of all men for all time.  However, should I transgress this Oath 
and violate it, may the opposite be my fate. 
U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, GREEK MEDICINE:  THE 
HIPPOCRATIC OATH, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2008). 
137 “There is a tragic mismatch between the health care many seriously ill people 
want and what they get . . . . We don’t know when or how to stop.”  Leon Jaroff, 
Knowing When to Stop, TIME, Dec. 4, 1995, at 76, 76 (quoting Dr. Knaus, author of 
a study on hospital death).  The definition of “harm” may include mental as well as 
physical damage.  See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2005).  Consequently, a doctor should not ignore the mental damage 
created by attending only to a patient’s physical needs.  A family practice doctor in 
Ohio noted that he attended a public education seminar on pain management and 
was “shocked that more than 30 percent of the patients in the audience raised their 
hands when asked if they had Kevorkian’s telephone number [to help them die]. . . .  
Dying patients want dignity, they want to be in control and they don’t want a tube 
in every orifice.”  Joyce Peterson & Karen Klinka, Suicide Requests Rare, State 
Doctors Say Focus on Care, Experts Urge, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 21, 1997, at 8. 
138 WAN HE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 65+ IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  2005, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-
209.pdf. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id.; see also CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK:  
UNITED STATES, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ 
us.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008) (stating life expectancy overall in 2008 is 78, with 
an expectancy of 75.15 for males and 80.97 for females). 
142 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“Medical technology has effectively created a twilight zone of 
suspended animation where death commences while life, in some form, 
continues.”). 
 926 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 895 
families and the pain for the soon-to-be deceased.  These 
twilight-zone patients “simply didn’t exist a generation ago 
because the technology and drugs that help keep them alive 
didn’t exist.”143  Doctors now recognize that some efforts to keep 
a person alive may be doing that patient more harm than 
good.144 
An overwhelming majority of Americans believe that an 
individual patient should have the right to refuse life support.145  
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that this right 
to refuse medical treatment was a fundamental liberty interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.146  Despite this, many state legislatures have had 
difficulty passing “living will” legislation recognizing this right 
because of opposition by groups that morally oppose the right on 
religious grounds. 
Polls also suggest that, even though efforts to identify a 
federal constitutional right to die failed,147 a majority of 
Americans favor physician-assisted death.148  This support has 
been a growing trend since 1947 when only thirty-seven percent 
 
143 See David Noonan, Special Care at the End of Life, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 2006, 
at 67, 67. 
144 See, e.g., HARRIS INTERACTIVE, HARRIS POLL #32, MAJORITIES OF U.S. 
ADULTS FAVOR EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE BY MORE 
THAN TWO-TO-ONE (2005), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp 
?PID=561 (reporting the results 2005 phone survey finding that more than two-
thirds of adults would like euthanasia for dying patients when requested by that 
patient, and two-thirds would like their state to adopt an Oregon-style Death with 
Dignity Act).  But see Polls Show Once Public Understands the Issue:  Doctor-
Assisted Suicide Fails, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 14, 2006 [hereinafter Polls Show] 
(discussing polls to the contrary).  An August 2005 Pew Research poll found only 
forty-four percent of people “[f]avor making it legal for doctors to Assist in 
suicide.”  Id. (“Nationwide sample of 1,502 adults, 18 years of age or older.”).  A 
May 2005 Gallup poll found forty-nine percent found doctor-assisted suicide 
“acceptable” and forty-two percent found it “wrong.”  Id. (“Telephone interviews 
with 1,005 national adults, aged 18 and older.”). 
145 For example, a 2005 poll by the Pew Research Center showed that eighty-four 
percent of those polled agreed that “patients [should have] the right to decide 
whether they want to be kept alive through medical treatment,” while ten percent 
disagreed.  PEW RESEARCH CTR., STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR RIGHT TO DIE 2 
(2006), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/266.pdf. 
146 See infra notes 174–79 and accompanying text (discussing the Cruzan case). 
147 See infra notes 192–225 and accompanying text (discussing the Quill and 
Glucksberg cases). 
148 Bill Theobald, Poll Finds Support for Assisted Dying, STATESMAN J., Oct. 17, 
2005, at B1. 
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polled supported PAD.149  In comparison, a Gallup poll in 1996 
showed that seventy-five percent of Americans favored PAD.150  
In addition, eight separate polls by Field Research since 1979 
show a majority of Californians, ranging from sixty-four to 
seventy-five percent, consistently support PAD.151 
Physicians, however, disagree about PAD.  But, it does have 
significant support within the medical community.  For example, 
physicians have given high approval ratings to its use under 
Oregon’s PAD statute,152 and several polls showed a majority of 
doctors favored PAD in certain circumstances.153  Moreover, the 
California Association of Physician Groups, the nation’s largest 
professional organization representing physicians practicing in 
the managed care model, recently voted to support PAD 
legislation in California.154  And although the American Medical 
Association and some state medical associations have opposed 
 
149 Franklin G. Miller & John C. Fletcher, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Active 
Euthanasia, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH 75, 78 (James M. Humber et al. eds., 
1994). 
150 Katherine C. Glynn, Note, Turning to State Legislatures to Legalize Physician-
Assisted Suicide for Seriously Ill, Non-Terminal Patients After Vacco v. Quill and 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 329, 351 n.129 (1997) (citing Jeff Hooten, 
A Slippery Slope to the Real Dr. Death, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1996, at B7). 
151 See Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide 
(Feb. 2006), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/2006-02.pdf.  In a Field poll in 
March of 2006, seventy percent supported a right for terminally ill patients to 
receive prescriptions for life-ending medication.  Id.  The percentage in favor 
dropped to sixty-two percent when the question asked if a doctor could administer 
the drugs.  Id. 
152 E.g., Theobald, supra note 148. 
153 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 748 n.12 (1997) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citing sources saying sixty percent of doctors in Oregon support PAD 
and fifty-six percent of doctors preferred legalizing assisted suicide to an explicit 
ban); Jonathan S. Cohen et al., Attitudes Toward Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 
Among Physicians in Washington State, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 89, 89 (1994) 
(noting fifty-three percent of physicians surveyed said it should be legal for doctors 
to perform PAD, but only forty percent said they were willing to do so); see also 
JOAN M. KRAUSKOPF ET AL., 1 ELDERLAW:  ADVOCACY FOR THE AGING §§ 
13.11–13.27, at 488–502 (2d ed. 1993). 
154  Vollmar, May 2007 Developments, supra note 10; see also About CAPG, 
http://www.capg.org/home/index.asp?page=7 (last visited July 19, 2007) (noting 
more than fifty percent of California healthcare is provided by members of the 
California Association of Physician Groups or CAPG).  The legislation, AB 374, 
did not pass.  See Nancy Vogel, Assisted Death Bill Fails Again in Capitol, L.A. 
TIMES, June 8, 2007, at B1 (noting the bill’s authors, knowing that they did not have 
the support to pass the legislation, failed to bring it for a vote). 
 928 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 895 
legalizing PAD,155 these same organizations “unequivocally 
endorse[] the practice of terminal sedation–the administration 
of sufficient dosages of pain-killing medication to terminally ill 
patients to protect them from excruciating pain even when it is 
clear that the time of death will be advanced.”156  The AMA also 
supports legislation permitting “palliative care,”157 or care 
allowing a physician to prescribe pain relief instead of curative 
treatment.158 
Physician support for terminal sedation and palliative care 
illustrates a troubling gray area in the entire PAD debate.  The 
distinction between “permitting death to ensue from an 
underlying fatal disease and causing it to occur by the 
 
155 Bryan Hilliard, The Politics of Palliative Care and the Ethical Boundaries of 
Medicine:  Gonzales v. Oregon as a Cautionary Tale, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 158, 
170 (2007) (“[S]ome professional medical organizations, most notably the American 
Medical Association, do indeed oppose making physician-assisted suicide legal.”); 
see also Ralph Jimenez, Legislators Debate Assisted-Suicide Bill:  New Hampshire, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 1993, at 37 (noting the New Hampshire Medical Society 
opposed a bill repealing New Hampshire’s ban on assisted suicide).  The California 
Medical Association opposed California Proposition 161 in 1992 and subsequent 
legislative efforts to legalize PAD.  Bailey, supra note 92; Mark Gladstone, Assisted-
Suicide Debate Shifts to State, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at A3. 
156 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 751 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
157 See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n, H-85.958 Palliative Care and End of Life Care, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=resultLink&doc=policyfiles/ 
HnE/H-85.958.HTM&s_t=palliative+care&catg=AMA/HnE&catg=AMA/BnGnC 
&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=1&&st_p=0&nth=2& (last visited Aug. 4, 2007).  The 
AMA states: 
Our AMA:  1.  Recognizes the importance of providing interdisciplinary 
palliative care for patients with disabling chronic or life-limiting illness to 
prevent and relieve suffering and to support the best possible quality of life 
for these patients and their families.  2.  Encourages research in the field of 
palliative medicine to improve treatment of unpleasant symptoms that 
affect quality of life for patients with advanced, chronic illness.                    
3.  Encourages physicians to be knowledgeable of patient eligibility criteria 
for hospice benefits and, realizing that prognostication is inexact, to make 
referrals based on their best clinical judgment. 
Id. 
158 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-104(4) (West 2006).  The statute 
provides: 
“Palliative care” means medical care and treatment provided by a licensed 
medical caregiver to a patient with an advanced chronic or terminal illness 
whose condition may not be responsive to curative treatment and who is, 
therefore, receiving treatment that relieves pain and suffering and supports 
the best possible quality of his or her life. 
Id. §§ 18-3-104(4)(b)(III), (4)(c) (“Paragraph (a) of this subsection (4) shall not be 
interpreted to permit a medical caregiver to assist in the suicide of the patient.”). 
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administration of medication or other means”159 is not always 
clear.  Sometimes it can rest solely on the prescribing doctor’s 
intent.  Yet, if the doctor is simply striving to “ease the patient’s 
suffering and to comply with [the patient’s] wishes . . . [then the] 
same intent and causation may exist.”160  In fact, thirty-one 
percent of doctors in one survey161 and twenty-three percent in 
another admitted they already had performed some form of 
PAD.162  Furthermore, no medical associations have supported 
criminalization of PAD, and some have stated they were 
“concerned about legislating what should go on between doctors 
and patients.”163 
 
159 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
160 Id. at 751; see also Peterson & Klinka, supra note 137 (quoting one doctor as 
saying, “But there are times when I feel like the morphine fairy because the only 
thing I can do for a terminally ill patient is maybe increase the dosage to make them 
comfortable,” and reporting another saying he “never believed the pain-relieving 
medications he gives [his patients] cause death, even though he has had patients die 
within minutes of receiving painkillers.  Admittedly, it’s a fine line. . . . But, ‘I’ve 
never had the feeling I’ve pushed someone over the line.’”). 
161 Glynn, supra note 150, at 334 n.28 (“In 1988, the Center for Health Ethics and 
Policy at the University of Colorado conducted a similar survey of all licensed 
doctors in Colorado.  Thirty-one percent of the 7,095 doctors surveyed responded, 
37% of whom admitted to giving life-shortening medication to patients.” (citing 
Diane E. Meir, Doctor’s Attitudes and Experiences with Physician-Assisted Death:  
A Review of the Literature, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH, supra note 149, at 1, 
14)); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 749 n.12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting 
eighteen percent of Michigan oncologists reported “active participation in assisted 
suicide,” twenty-four percent of physicians who treat AIDS patients responded they 
would “likely grant a patient’s request for assistance in hastening death,” and 
several doctors in Washington State said they had complied with their patients’ 
requests to hasten death). 
162 Glynn, supra note 150, at 334 n.28 (“The survey was conducted in 1987 by the 
National Hemlock Society.  5,000 California physicians that were members of the 
American Medical Association were surveyed anonymously by mail.  Only 12% of 
the physicians surveyed responded.” (citations omitted)).  Eighty-one percent of 
those physicians who did perform PAD in the second survey confessed to doing it 
more than once.  Id. at 334; see also Diane Martindale, A Culture of Death, SCI. 
AM., May 23, 2005, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=a-culture-of-death. 
163 Christopher Rowland, Should Death Be Hastened?  Senate Bill Would Make 
Doctor-Assisted Suicide a Felony, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL. (R.I.), May 24, 1996, at 
1A (quoting Arthur Frazzano, president of the Rhode Island Medical Society, 
testifying about why the group took a neutral position on a bill criminalizing PAD 
in Rhode Island).  Legislation that criminalizes PAD also could have a chilling 
effect on the use of palliative care because “physicians must worry that law 
enforcement officers will see a criminal intent where none existed.”  David 
Orentlicher & Arthur Caplan, The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999:  A Serious 
Threat to Palliative Care, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 255, 256 (2000); see also infra 
notes 277–82 and accompanying text. 
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Despite this significant support for PAD, only one state in the 
Union allows it, and that state legalized the practice through a 
citizen initiative.164  Similarly, Congress and some state 
legislatures have made efforts to legalize PAD, but all of these 
efforts also have failed.  Instead, interest groups have been able 
to take advantage of the traditional legislative process to 
promote minority views on the topic.  Consequently, only 
Oregon’s direct vote by initiative successfully reflected the will 
of most citizens. 
A.  On the Federal Side of the Federalism Balance:  A Federal 
Constitutional Right to Choose Death 
The first wave of the modern PAD debate began in the courts.  
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized a fundamental right to 
choose death by refusing medical treatment that prolonged 
dying.165  By grounding the right in the Constitution, the Court 
effectively ended further state debate on the issue. 
Arguably, choosing death by refusing medical treatment that 
prolongs dying is simply the reciprocal of a right to die by 
requesting medical treatment to hasten dying.  The Supreme 
Court had the opportunity to recognize constitutional protection 
for such a right to die.  If the Court had done so, the debate over 
PAD would have ended at the federal level; preemption would 
prevent states from restricting a right that was constitutionally 
protected.  However, the Court tossed the debate from the 
federal to the state realm when it refused to recognize a right to 
die or to receive assistance in choosing death. 
1.  The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment 
The courts first recognized a constitutional right to choose 
death by refusing medical treatment in response to cases 
involving medical treatment that extended patients’ lives.  
Although over a hundred cases addressed this right under 
various common law and constitutional theories,166 the 
 
164 See infra notes 301–20 and accompanying text. 
165 See infra notes 166–79 and accompanying text. 
166 See Hoefler, supra note 27, at 156–58 (listing theories including informed 
consent under the common law, a federal Constitutional privacy right, and a 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest). 
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predominant framework for the debate arose in two cases:  In re 
Quinlan167 and Cruzan v. Harmon.168 
Ironically, in the late 1970s, a comatose patient awoke the 
American public to the problems created by extending life 
through modern medical technology.169  At the age of twenty-
one, Karen Ann Quinlan lapsed into a persistent vegetative 
state170 after ingesting alcohol and drugs.171  The hospital placed 
Quinlan on a respirator and, despite the wishes of her family, 
refused to take her off.  Although the district court denied her 
guardian’s request for authority to remove the respirator,172 the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that removal of the 
respirator to allow Quinlan to die naturally was a valuable 
incident to Ms. Quinlan’s right to privacy under the U.S. and 
New Jersey constitutions and could be asserted by her 
guardian.173 
 
167 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). 
168 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff’d sub nom., Cruzan v. Dir., 
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
169 The Court stated: 
 The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the 
patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse 
treatment.  Until about 15 years ago and the seminal decision in [Quinlan], 
the number of right-to-refuse-treatment decisions was relatively few.  Most 
of the earlier cases involved patients who refused medical treatment 
forbidden by their religious beliefs, thus implicating First Amendment 
rights as well as common-law rights of self-determination.  More recently, 
however, with the advance of medical technology capable of sustaining life 
well past the point where natural forces would have brought certain death 
in earlier times, cases involving the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment 
have burgeoned. 
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 (footnotes omitted); see also FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT 
TO TREATMENT § 7.1, at 415–23 (1984); Norman L. Cantor, A Patient’s Decision to 
Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment:  Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of 
Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 229 n.5 (1973) (noting paucity of cases); Margeurite 
Ann Chapman, The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act:  Too Little, Too Late?, 
42 ARK. L. REV. 319, 324 n.15 (1989).  See generally Kristine Cordier Karnezis, 
Annotation, Patient’s Right to Refuse Treatment Allegedly Necessary to Sustain Life, 
93 A.L.R.3D 67 (1979) (collecting cases). 
170 Defined as “generally, a condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes 
but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function.”  Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 
266. 
171 Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan:  A Review of the 
Jurisprudence of Death and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 183 (2001). 
172 Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 653. 
173 The Court stated: 
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Not until the early 1990s, thirteen years after Quinlan, did the 
U.S. Supreme Court speak to the same issue of a patient’s right 
to refuse life-sustaining treatment.  A single car accident in rural 
southwest Missouri landed Nancy Cruzan in the hospital in a 
persistent vegetative state.174  Cruzan’s family sought to have the 
feeding tube providing her with artificial nutrition removed 
when it became apparent that Cruzan had no chance of 
regaining her mental faculties.175  Although the district court 
issued a declaratory judgment instructing the hospital to remove 
the feeding tube, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, finding 
that Ms. Cruzan’s right to refuse medical treatment did not 
outweigh the state’s policy favoring preservation of life 
embodied in Missouri’s living will statute.176 
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a five-to-four 
decision, affirmed.177  Primarily, the Court affirmed a state’s 
 
 Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy, 
Supreme Court decisions have recognized that a right of personal privacy 
exists and that certain areas of privacy are guaranteed under the 
Constitution.  The Court has interdicted judicial intrusion into many 
aspects of personal decision, sometimes basing this restraint upon the 
conception of a limitation of judicial interest and responsibility, such as 
with regard to contraception and its relationship to family life and decision. 
 The Court in Griswold found the unwritten constitutional right of 
privacy to exist in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights 
‘formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance.’  Presumably this right is broad enough to encompass a patient’s 
decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much 
the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision to 
terminate pregnancy under certain conditions. 
 Nor is such right of privacy forgotten in the New Jersey Constitution. 
Id. at 663 (citations omitted).  Ironically, when Quinlan was weaned from the 
respirator, she was able to breathe on her own and passed away ten years later in a 
nursing home.  See Lawrence K. Altman, Quinlan Case Is Revisited and Yields New 
Finding, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1994, at A16. 
174 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1998), aff’d sub nom., Cruzan v. 
Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  Note that many patients with brain 
injuries transition from a coma to a vegetative state. Steven Laureys, Eyes Open, 
Brain Shut, SCI. AM., May 2007, at 84, 84.  If they remain in a vegetative state for 
over a year, the “chances of [regaining consciousness] are close to zero.”  See id. at 
86. 
175 Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411. 
176 Id. 
177 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 265.  After Quinlan, however, most courts have based a 
right to refuse treatment either solely on the common law right to informed consent 
or on both the common law right and a constitutional privacy right.  See LAURENCE 
H. TRIBE ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1365 (2d ed. 1988). 
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power to safeguard against potential abuses by requiring clear 
and convincing evidence of an incompetent person’s desire to 
have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn.178  Significantly, 
however, the Court in Cruzan for the first time considered 
alternative theories set forth in state cases addressing the right to 
refuse medical treatment.  Cruzan stands out because the Court 
held that competent individuals have, under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical 
treatment.”179 
2.  But No Right to Die 
A conjunction of societal forces resulted in fevered activity on 
the PAD issue in the five years immediately following the 
Cruzan decision.180  In 1993, the Hemlock Society established the 
 
178 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278–82.  The Court stated: 
 Petitioners insist that under the general holdings of our cases, the forced 
administration of life-sustaining medical treatment, and even of artificially 
delivered food and water essential to life, would implicate a competent 
person’s liberty interest.  Although we think the logic of the cases discussed 
above would embrace such a liberty interest, the dramatic consequences 
involved in refusal of such treatment would inform the inquiry as to 
whether the deprivation of that interest is constitutionally permissible.  But 
for purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution 
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse 
lifesaving hydration and nutrition. 
Id. at 279.  “But determining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’ under the Due 
Process Clause does not end the inquiry; ‘whether respondent’s constitutional rights 
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the 
relevant state interests.’”  Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 
(1982)). 
179 Id. at 278.  The Court noted:  “Although many state courts have held that a 
right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of 
privacy, we have never so held.  We believe this issue is more properly analyzed in 
terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.”  Id. 
 After Cruzan, Congress passed the Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1395cc(f) (2006).  This Act merely requires medical providers to make information 
available to patients so they are aware of their right to refuse medical treatment.  § 
1395cc(f)(1)(A).  Because the Supreme Court recognized this as a right protected 
by the Constitution, Congress could not pass legislation determining whether the 
right was appropriate or not.  Similarly, states addressed the issue only by passing 
legislation addressing procedures for exercising the federal constitutional right.  
E.g., N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-54 (2008). 
180 Glynn, supra note 150, at 350–51.  Arguably, the debate started beforehand 
because the Euthanasia Society of America, the first American organization to 
crusade for the legalization of euthanasia, was founded in 1938.  Id. 
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Patients’ Rights Organization, a political action group to 
advocate the cause of PAD.181  Compassion in Dying, an 
alternate PAD group, was founded in 1993, and in 1997, created 
its national advocacy group, the Compassion in Dying 
Federation, which participated in many of the pivotal cases on 
the issue.182  Scholars weighed in,183 and opposing groups, such as 
 
181 Compassion & Choices, Milestones in the Modern Choice in Dying 
Movement, http://www.compassionandchoices.org/aboutus/themovement.php (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2007).  Note also in 1991, Derek Humphrey, founder of the Hemlock 
Society, first published Final Exit:  The Practicalities of Self-Deliverance for the 
Terminally Ill.  Id.  In 2003, the Hemlock Society merged with Compassion in Dying 
and changed its name to End of Life Choices.  Id. 
182 See id.; see also KRAUSKOPF ET AL., supra note 153, §§ 13.11–13.27, at 488–
502 (stating Compassion in Dying brought the Quill and Glucksberg cases). 
183 See, e.g., JAMES M. HOEFLER WITH BRIAN E. KAMOIE, DEATHRIGHT (1994); 
Michael P. Allen, The Constitution at the Threshold of Life and Death:  A Suggested 
Approach to Accommodate an Interest in Life and a Right to Die, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 
971 (2004); Brian H. Bix, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Federalism, 17 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 53 (2003); Cantor, supra note 169; Bette-Jane 
Crigger, Dying Well?  A Colloquy on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 1992, at 6; Scott Gast, Who Defines “Legitimate Medical 
Practice?”  Lessons Learned from the Controlled Substances Act, Physician-Assisted 
Suicide, & Oregon v. Ashcroft, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 261 (2002); Neil M. 
Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 599 (2000); Thane Josef Messinger, A Gentle and Easy Death:  From Ancient 
Greece to Beyond Cruzan Toward A Reasoned Legal Response to the Societal 
Dilemma of Euthanasia, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 175 (1993); Colin Miller, A Death by 
Any Other Name:  The Federal Government’s Inconsistent Treatment of Drugs Used 
in Lethal Injections and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 17 J.L. & HEALTH 217 (2002–
03) [hereinafter Miller, A Death by Any Other Name]; Colin Miller, Escape from 
New York:  Analyzing the State’s Relative Interests in Proscribing the Withdrawal of 
Life Support and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 779 
(2003) [hereinafter Miller, Escape from New York]; Jim Persels, Forcing the Issue of 
Physician-Assisted Suicide:  Impact of the Kevorkian Case on the Euthanasia Debate, 
14 J. LEGAL MED. 93 (1993); Carol A. Pratt, Efforts to Legalize Physician-Assisted 
Suicide in New York, Washington and Oregon:  A Contrast Between Judicial and 
Initiative Approaches–Who Should Decide?, 77 OR. L. REV. 1027 (1998); Christin 
A. Batt, Comment, The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999 and Physician-Assisted 
Suicide:  A Call for Congressional Self-Restraint, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 297 (2001); 
Janet M. Branigan, Note, Michigan’s Struggle with Assisted Suicide and Related 
Issues as Illuminated by Current Case Law:  An Overview of People v. Kevorkian, 
72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 959 (1995); Richard J. Brumbaugh, Comment, The 
Oregon Death with Dignity Act:  Reversal of the Department of Justice’s Position on 
Physician Assisted Suicide and the Ensuing Court Battle, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 377 (2002); Stephanie A. Damiani, Comment, Up with Life and Down with 
Pain:  The Pain Relief Promotion Act:  Congressional Attempt to Address the Issue 
of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 5 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 191 (2001–02); Kelly 
Green, Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia:  Safeguarding Against the 
“Slippery Slope”–The Netherlands Versus the United States, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV 639 (2003); Stephanie Hendricks, Note, Pain Relief, Death with Dignity, and 
 2007] Fast-Food Government and Physician-Assisted Death 935 
the Catholic Church, issued sanctity of life statements184 and 
“vowed to wage an intensive legal, legislative and media 
campaign against [PAD].”185 
The AIDS epidemic played a significant role in the PAD 
debate in the 1980s and early 1990s.186  Because many of those 
 
Commerce:  The Constitutionality of Congressional Attempts to Regulate Physician-
Assisted Suicide in Oregon via the Commerce Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 37 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 691 (2001); Philip King, Note, Washington v. Glucksberg:  
Influence of the Court in Care of the Terminally Ill and Physician Assisted Suicide, 
15 J.L. & HEALTH 271 (2000–01); Kathryn E. Mazzeo, Comment, The Right to Die 
Versus the Right to Live–Who Decides?  The Long and Wandering Road to a 
Legislative Solution, 66 ALB. L. REV. 263 (2002); Recent Case, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1371 (2005). 
184 See, e.g., Jimenez, supra note 155 (“[A]ll human life [is] a gift from God over 
which we have stewardship but not absolute dominion.” (quoting Bishop Leo 
O’Neal of Roman Catholic Diocese of Manchester, N.H.)); U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, Life at Risk (Nov. 1998), http://www.usccb.org/prolife/publicat/ 
liferisk/nov98.shtml (excerpts from the Bishops’ Statement on the Sanctity of 
Human Life); U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Statement on Euthanasia (Sept. 
12, 1991), http://www.usccb.org/prolife/issues/euthanas/euthnccb.shtml; Vatican, 
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith:  Declaration on Euthanasia 
(1980), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con 
_cfaith_doc_19800505_euthanasia_en.html; see also Kevin D. O’Rourke, Physician 
Assisted Suicide, A Religious Perspective, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 433, 441–44 
(1996). 
185 Diego Ribadeneira, Bishops Hit Assisted Suicide, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 
1996, at A34.  At their fall meeting in Boston, the U.S. Catholic bishops of the 
Roman Catholic Church, “along with evangelical Christian denominations and 
Muslim groups, recently filed briefs with the Supreme Court opposing doctor-
assisted suicide.”  Id.  But cf. JAMES M. HOEFLER, MANAGING DEATH 63 (1997) 
(“Now, most mainstream Catholic organizations have abandoned their 
obstructionism of years past and joined forces with more progressive elements of 
the debate . . . .”). 
186 Pratt, supra note 183, at 1029–32.  But note that some of the impetus may have 
died: 
 The effectiveness of the newly developed protease inhibitors in 
combating AIDS and forestalling death may, for some members of the gay 
community, lessen the sense of urgency to legalize PAS.  However, 
protease inhibitors are a limited, and as yet incomplete, solution to the 
AIDS epidemic and are therefore unlikely to supplant entirely the interest 
of the gay community in PAS.  The tremendous expense of the drugs 
precludes access to the medication for many persons who are HIV positive 
or who have AIDS.  Moreover, the efficacy of the drugs is highly 
dependent upon a strict daily regimen that requires extreme punctuality 
and coordination of eating and sleeping.  Maintenance of this rigorous 
regimen challenges even the most disciplined individuals.  In addition, the 
drugs are not effective for some individuals who take them faithfully, and 
forty percent of all AIDS patients who take the drugs develop a resistance 
to them.  Thus, at least for the near future, AIDS still looms as a fatal 
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infected with HIV/AIDS were young or middle-aged, the 
demographic of those seeking PAD expanded beyond the 
traditionally more vulnerable “old” and “infirm.”187  
Furthermore, the “persistent questioning of authority by AIDS 
activists and their skepticism toward ‘standard medical 
authority’ . . . resulted in a throwing off of that medical snobbery 
which insists on life at any cost.”188  AIDS activists added “well 
organized and well financed legal and political clout to the legal 
battles.”189 
The proponents of PAD argued that the right to refuse 
medical treatment should logically be extended to a 
constitutional right to use medical treatment to hasten death or 
alternatively, a constitutional right to die.190  In an effort to have 
the courts recognize the right to die, these activists filed several 
cases in the mid-1990s, challenging the constitutionality of laws 
outlawing assisted suicide.  Some states were using assisted-
suicide bans to sanction physicians who wished to assist patients 
in exercising the alleged right to die.191  The U.S. Supreme Court 
resolved the debate in two of these cases by refusing to 
recognize that choosing death was a right protected by the 
Federal Constitution.192 
 
disease of epidemic proportions, and it will continue to fuel the controversy 
over legalizing PAS. 
Id. at 1030–31 (footnotes omitted). 
187 Id. at 1030; see Jeremy A. Sitcoff, Note, Death with Dignity:  AIDS and a Call 
for Legislation Securing the Right to Assisted Suicide, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 677, 
687–88 (1996). 
188 Pratt, supra note 183, at 1029 (quoting Andrew Solomon, A Death of One’s 
Own, NEW YORKER, May 22, 1995, at 57, 57). 
189 Id. at 1030.  “Both the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. and 
the National Association of People with AIDS filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf 
of the plaintiffs in the New York and Washington PAS cases.”  Id. (citing Quill v. 
Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 
F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994)). 
190 For proponents arguments, see generally Allen, supra note 183; Bix, supra 
note 183; Cantor, supra note 171; Miller, A Death by Any Other Name, supra note 
183; Miller, Escape from New York, supra note 183; Pratt, supra note 183; Batt, 
supra note 183; Brumbaugh, supra note 183; Mazzeo, supra note 183. 
191 See infra notes 268–80 and accompanying text for further discussion of state 
assisted-suicide statutes. 
192 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).  Kevorkian’s efforts 
to have the Michigan Supreme Court recognize a right to die failed when the court 
found that the question was not void for vagueness and that there was no 
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest or equal protection violation.  See infra 
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In Quill v. Koppel,193 a group of New York physicians filed 
suit against the State of New York challenging New York’s ban 
on assisted suicide194 as violating the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The physicians asserted that it 
would be consistent with the standards of their medical practices 
to prescribe lethal medication for mentally competent, 
terminally ill patients who were suffering great pain and desired 
a doctor’s help in taking their own lives.195  However, these same 
physicians asserted that if they did prescribe lethal doses of 
medication, they could be subject to prosecution under the 
assisted-suicide laws.196  The crux of the physicians’ argument 
was that it was inconsistent for the State to allow a mentally 
competent adult to decline life sustaining treatment while at the 
same time barring such individuals from seeking assistance in 
taking their lives.197  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the State, finding that the physicians’ 
arguments failed as a matter of law and that the state statute was 
unambiguous and did not violate the Constitution.198 
On appeal in Quill v. Vacco,199 the Second Circuit reversed.  
The Second Circuit rejected a due process analysis similar to that 
of the Cruzan Court and refused to hold that terminal patients 
who chose to end their lives by self-administering prescribed 
drugs enjoyed the same Cruzan due process right to hasten 
death by removing life-support systems.200 
However, the Second Circuit did adopt an equal protection 
analysis, agreeing with the doctors that the two groups were 
similarly situated: 
 
note 295.  A case brought by a terminally ill patient and his doctor in Florida failed.  
The Florida Supreme Court found that Florida’s assisted-suicide ban did not violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Florida Constitution’s privacy clause.  Krischer 
v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1997); see also KRAUSKOPF ET AL., supra note 153, 
§§ 13.11–13.27, at 488–502. 
193 870 F. Supp. 78, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d in part sub nom., Quill v. Vacco, 80 
F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d in part, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
194 See N.Y. PENAL L. § 125.15 (McKinney 1999). 
195 Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 80. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 79. 
198 Id. 
199 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d in part, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
200 Id. at 728–29. 
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[T]hose in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-
support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing 
the removal of such systems; but those who are similarly 
situated, except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining 
equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-
administering prescribed drugs.
201
 
Consequently, the Second Circuit concluded that, to the 
extent the New York criminal statutes prohibited a physician 
from prescribing medications to be self-administered by a 
mentally competent person in the final stages of a terminal 
illness, such statutes were not rationally related to any legitimate 
state interest and violated the Equal Protection Clause.202 
On certiorari in Vacco v. Quill, the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed, finding that the New York law did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause.203  The Court maintained that the 
distinction between life-sustaining treatment and death-
hastening treatment that warranted one to be recognized as a 
fundamental right and the other not, also was a rational 
distinction for equal protection purposes.204  Consequently, New 
York’s assisted-suicide statute, which could include PAD within 
its prohibitions, did not infringe upon the basic right to refuse 
life sustaining treatment, and New York’s distinction between 
the right to refuse treatment and assisted suicide was rational 
and served an important public interest.205 
On the very same day it decided Vacco, the Supreme Court 
also issued its opinion on another challenge to an assisted-
suicide ban in Washington v. Glucksberg.206  A group of 
Washington residents filed the suit asserting that a state law 
banning assisted suicide207 was unconstitutional on its face.208  
The Ninth Circuit held, in an en banc decision, that patients have 
a “due process liberty interest in controlling the time and 
 
201 Id. at 729. 
202 Id. at 727–31. 
203 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997). 
204 See id. at 803–08. 
205 Id. at 808–09. 
206 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
207 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060(1) (West 1994). 
208 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.  The Ninth Circuit had held that the statute’s 
categorical prohibition was unconstitutional as applied to a class rather than 
individual plaintiffs.  Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 838 (9th Cir. 
1996), rev’d sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
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manner of [their] death[s]–that there is, in short, a 
constitutionally recognized ‘right to die.’”209 
The Supreme Court reversed, using the law’s historical 
rejection of suicide as a basis for refusing to recognize a liberty 
interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.210  According to Justice Rehnquist’s majority 
opinion, if the right to assist with suicide did not rise to the level 
of a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process 
Clause, then Washington’s statute prohibiting it needed only to 
be “rationally related to legitimate government interests.”211  
Washington State’s goals of preserving human life and upholding 
the integrity and ethics of the medical profession were sufficient 
to meet this simple relationship test to overcome the Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge.212 
Remarkably, five justices filed concurring opinions, including 
four concurrences that addressed both Glucksberg and Vacco.213  
While some of the justices expressed support for “personal 
control over the manner of death,”214 overall the justices 
 
209 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.  The original lawsuit was brought by 
four physicians and three terminally ill patients.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707.  The 
patients died before the case reached the Ninth Circuit.  See id. at 707–08. 
210 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710–28.  Arguably, the Supreme Court’s opinion 
rested on confused semantics.  For example, the Court distinguished sexual acts by 
consenting homosexuals from acts of “sodomy” in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003).  By noting that “the concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of 
person did not emerge until the late 19th century,” the Court could ignore 
traditional laws outlawing sodomy and conclude that “[t]he policy of punishing 
consenting adults for private acts was not much discussed in the early legal 
literature.”  Id. at 568–70.  Similarly, if the Court had concluded that physician-
assisted death was distinct from “suicide” as current medical organizations 
conclude, cf. supra note 10, then the examination of traditional laws outlawing 
suicide or assisted suicide would be irrelevant.  See also Yale Kamisar, Can 
Glucksberg Survive Lawrence?  Another Look at the End of Life and Personal 
Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (noting “nobody was claiming a 
right to a physician’s assistance in committing suicide generally–only a right to a 
physician’s help in very special circumstances”). 
211 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728. 
212 Id. at 735. 
213 See generally id. at 736–92 (concurring opinions of Justices O’Connor, 
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer). 
214 Id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see also id. at 744 (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (noting Cruzan’s right rested also implicitly “on the even more 
fundamental right to make this ‘deeply personal decision’”). 
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concluded that the states’ interests215 and the availability of 
alternatives216 outweighed recognizing a new unenumerated 
“right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance 
in doing so.”217 
Most notably for the federalism issue, the justices deferred 
resolution of the PAD debate to the states by failing to 
recognize a federal constitutional right in Glucksberg or Vacco.  
Each of the separate opinions references in some way the 
importance of allowing the states to address PAD. 
For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted: 
[T]he States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful 
examinations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar 
issues. . . . 
 . . . . 
 Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an 
earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and 
practicality of physician-assisted suicide.  Our holding permits 
this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.
218
 
Similarly, Justice O’Connor stated: 
 
215 Washington’s statute sought to protect vulnerable groups, such as the poor, 
elderly, and disabled from abuse, neglect, and mistakes.  Id. at 732 (majority 
opinion).  But see Miller, Escape from New York, supra note 183, at 779 (noting the 
distinction that the Court drew in Vacco v. Quill was contrary to the reasons cited 
by the Court in stating that the distinction protects vulnerable members of society).  
All of the state interests identified by the Supreme Court in rejecting a right to 
assisted suicide are “implicated to a higher degree by withdrawal of life support.”  
Id.  “The primary reason for this difference is that withdrawal of life support often 
involves incompetent patients and surrogate decision making while assisted suicide 
by definition requires a competent patient choosing to hasten her death.”  Id.  The 
withdrawal of life support is much more akin to the “involuntary euthanasia 
performed in the Netherlands” because that practice is often performed on 
incompetent individuals.  Id. at 806; see also Green, supra note 183, at 640–43 
(attributing different views of when it is proper to end life to cultural differences 
between the United States and the Netherlands and stating that the objective 
requirements in the United States adequately protect against the “slippery slope” 
that is the subjective practice in the Netherlands). 
216 Several of the justices seemed persuaded by the availability of palliative care 
to “alleviate suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening 
death.”  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (O’Connor, J. joined by Breyer, J., concurring). 
217 Id. at 723 (majority opinion). 
218 Id. at 719, 735.  If the Glucksberg Court had decided that assisted suicide was 
a protected right, then the debate would have been resolved.  In a subsequent case 
on assisted suicide, the Ninth Circuit was explicit in “tak[ing] no position on the 
merits or morality” of the issue.  Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 
2004), aff’d sub nom., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
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There is no reason to think the democratic process will not 
strike the proper balance between the interests of terminally 
ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end 
their suffering and the State’s interests in protecting those who 
might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure.  As the 
Court recognizes, States are presently undertaking extensive 
and serious evaluation of physician-assisted suicide and other 
related issues. . . . In such circumstances, “the . . . challenging 
task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding . . . 
liberty interests is entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States . . . 
in the first instance.”
219
 
In addition, Justice Souter noted:  “Legislatures, however, are 
not so constrained [as the Court is in recognizing new 
unenumerated rights].  The experimentation that should be out 
of the question in constitutional adjudication displacing 
legislative judgments is entirely proper, as well as highly 
desirable, when the legislative power addresses an emerging 
issue like assisted suicide.”220 
Finally, Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, drew a parallel 
with the changing approach society has taken with capital 
punishment:  “The Court ends its opinion with the important 
observation that our holding today is fully consistent with a 
continuation of the vigorous debate about the ‘morality, legality, 
and practicality of physician-assisted suicide’ in a democratic 
society.”221 
If the Court had determined that assisted suicide was a 
constitutional liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the debate over PAD would have been over.  
Federal constitutional law then would have preempted any state 
attempt to control PAD.  The Court, however, declined to do so.  
Instead, the Court recognized the tension created when public 
“[a]ttitudes toward suicide itself have changed . . . but our laws 
have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting 
suicide.”222  The Court’s refusal to federalize the issue permitted 
 
219 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
220 Id. at 789 (Souter, J., concurring) (“The Court should accordingly stay its hand 
to allow reasonable legislative consideration.  While I do not decide for all time that 
respondents’ [due process] claim should not be recognized, I acknowledge the 
legislative institutional competence as the better one to deal with that claim at this 
time.”). 
221 Id. at 738 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
222 Id. at 719 (majority opinion). 
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the states to play their key role in resolving the debate by 
experimenting with solutions. 
But outside forces served to prevent the federalism model of 
experimentation from working smoothly within the state 
legislative process.  Opponents of PAD applauded the Court’s 
decisions in Quill and Glucksberg, suggesting those decisions 
were “a devastating blow to the movement.”223  These groups 
also had filed amicus briefs in the key U.S. Supreme Court 
cases224 and stood ready to thwart any expansion of PAD by 
asserting their influence at the state level through the pressure-
point process.225 
3.  Federal Legislation 
Although some members of Congress have attempted to use 
federal legislation to shift control of PAD back to the federal 
forum, their efforts have failed.  Most of these federal attempts 
to address PAD focused primarily on revisions to the existing 
Controlled Substances Act,226 which regulates drug use, 
specifically some of the drugs used by physicians to assist 
patients with dying.227 
In response to voter affirmation of Oregon’s PAD initiative, 
members of Congress introduced the Lethal Drug Abuse 
 
223 Bailey, supra note 92. 
224 E.g., Brief for the U.S. Catholic Conference et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 95-1858), 1996 WL 656248; Brief for the 
U.S. Catholic Conference et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Vacco v. 
Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1996) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 650919. 
225 E.g., Bailey, supra note 92 (“And [the Catholic Church and the California 
Medical Society] hold sway here in the Capitol as well.  This is going to be 
something that’s very difficult to accomplish legislatively.”). 
226 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2006). 
227 The Controlled Substances Act states that any schedule II drug, that is, drugs 
that are only available through prescription, must be used for a “legitimate medical 
purpose by an individual practitioner . . . acting in the usual course of [his] 
professional practice.”  § 830.  To prevent diversion of controlled substances, the 
Controlled Substances Act regulates the activity of physicians, who must register in 
accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.  § 822.  
The Attorney General may deny, suspend, or revoke a registration that, as relevant 
here, would be “inconsistent with the public interest.”  § 824(a)(4).  In determining 
consistency with the public interest, the Attorney General must consider several 
factors, including a state’s recommendation; compliance with state, federal, and 
local law regarding controlled substances; and “public health and safety.”  § 823(f).  
The Controlled Substances Act explicitly contemplates a role for the states as well 
as the Attorney General in regulating controlled substances.  See § 903. 
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Prevention Act (“LDAPA”) in 1998 as an amendment to the 
Controlled Substances Act.228  The purpose of this bill was to 
“clarify Federal law to prohibit the dispensing or distribution of 
a controlled substance for the purpose of causing, or assisting in 
causing, the suicide or euthanasia of any individual.”229  The 
proposed change would have allowed the Attorney General to 
determine that registration of a medical practitioner is 
inconsistent with the public interest if “the Attorney General 
determines, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the 
applicant is applying for the registration with the intention of 
using the registration” to “intentionally . . . distribute[] a 
controlled substance with a purpose of causing . . . the suicide or 
euthanasia” of a person.230  The bill further would have allowed 
the Attorney General to revoke the registration of any such 
offending medical practitioners.231  The LDAPA passed the 
House of Representatives, but failed to make it out of the 
Health and Human Services Committee when it reached the 
Senate.232 
The year after the LDAPA failed, Congress considered the 
Pain Relief Promotion Act (“PRPA”) to support the use of 
PAD.233  This legislation proposed to amend the Controlled 
Substances Act to allow palliative care by providing that 
“alleviating pain or discomfort in the usual course of 
professional practice is a legitimate medical purpose for the 
dispensing, distributing, or administering of a controlled 
substance that is consistent with public health and safety, even if 
the use of such a substance may increase the risk of death.”234 
 
228 Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act (LDAPA) of 1998, H.R. 4006, 105th 
Cong. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. § 2(a)(i)(2). 
231 Id. § 2(b)(1). 
232 See Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide 
(Mar. 1999), available at http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/1999-03.pdf 
[hereinafter Vollmer, Mar. 1999, Developments]. 
233 Pain Relief Promotion Act (PRPA) of 1999, S. 1272, 106th Cong.  Whereas 
the LDAPA was opposed by the AMA because it feared “doctors would be 
reluctant to prescribe adequate pain relief for suffering patients,” the AMA and 
National Hospice Association supported the PRPA.  Stacy A. Tromble, Note, A 
Dialogue on Death & Deference:  Gonzales v. Oregon, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1639, 
1667–68 (2007). 
234 S. 1272 § 101(i)(1); see also supra notes 10, 157–64 and accompanying text for 
more discussion of palliative care. 
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The PRPA bill had the twin aims of (1) promoting the use of 
controlled substances in palliative care while expressly refusing 
to create a federal right to use controlled substances in the 
intentional taking of life,235 and (2) still recognizing state laws 
that allowed such a right.236  This bill passed the House of 
Representatives, and survived a divided vote in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, but failed to make it to the Senate floor. 
In May 2006, Senator Sam Brownback, a Republican from 
Kansas, chaired a hearing before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 
and Property Rights.  This hearing was titled “The 
Consequences of Legalized Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia.”237  
In August 2006, Senator Brownback introduced the Assisted 
Suicide Prevention Act of 2006, but Oregon Senator Ron Wyden 
threatened to filibuster if the bill came to a vote.238  The bill was 
never called, but Senator Brownback included federal 
opposition to PAD as one of the platform issues in his bid for 
the Republican presidential nomination in 2008.239 
Although the 1998 and 1999 efforts to amend the Controlled 
Substances Act made significant progress in Congress, neither of 
these bills passed the congressional pressure points.  
Furthermore, subsequent efforts at the national level also have 
 
235 The bill noted that “nothing in this Act authorizes intentionally dispensing or 
administering a controlled substance for purposes of causing death or assisting 
another person in causing death.”  S. 1272 § 101(i)(2). 
236 The PRPA required the Attorney General to give “no force and effect to 
State law authorizing or permitting assisted suicide or euthanasia.”  Id. § 101(i)(2). 
237 See Jeff Kosseff, GOP Puts Suicide Law in Spotlight, OREGONIAN, June 12, 
2006, at A1. 
238 Kansas Senator’s Legislation Aims to Negate Assisted Suicide Law, REG. 
GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Aug. 9, 2006, at F1 (noting the “public hold” on the bill 
would prevent the legislation from being voted on unless sixty senators move to lift 
it).  The bill would have prohibited doctors from prescribing federally controlled 
substances for the purpose of aid in dying.  Id.  Legislation would eviscerate the 
Oregon law and impact patients nationwide by placing a punitive restriction on a 
physician’s ability to adequately treat pain at end of life.  Id.  The prepared 
testimony and witness list from the hearing can be found on the U.S. Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s website at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1916 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2007). 
239 See Jeff Kosseff, Assisted Suicide May Become Newest GOP Campaign Issue, 
RELIGION NEWS, http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID=10741 (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2008). 
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been unsuccessful,240 thus ensuring for now, the significance of 
federalism and state efforts in resolving the PAD debate. 
B.  On the State Side of the Federalism Balance:  State Legislation 
and Initiatives 
Federalism traditionally relegated the resolution of issues 
grounded in deep moral beliefs to the states.241  To some, it has 
been a stinging loss of self-government when unelected Supreme 
Court justices determine the outcome of a moral debate by 
declaring protections under the U.S. Constitution.242  As Justice 
Scalia observed in the context of abortion rights, when the Court 
preempts these moral issues, it usurps “sovereignty over a field 
where it has little proper business.”243  Consequently, the PAD 
 
240 The Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzales v. Oregon, discussed infra notes 
336–45, and the Terry Schiavo situation in Florida revived the PAD debate 
nationally.  See, e.g., William H. Colby, From Quinlan to Cruzan to Schiavo:  What 
Have We Learned, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 279 (2006) (article adapted from speech 
given by the attorney who represented Nancy Cruzan); Annie Danino, Dodging the 
Issue of Physician Assisted Suicide:  The Supreme Court’s Likely Response in 
Gonzales v. Oregon, 10 J. MED. & L. 299 (2006); David Sclar, U.S. Supreme Court 
Ruling in Gonzales v. Oregon Upholds the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, 34 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 639 (2006); Colburn, supra note 10. 
 There has also been PAD debate on the state level.  See, e.g., Bill to Legalize 
Assisted Suicide in California Rejected by Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S. 
NEWSWIRE, June 27, 2006; Editorial, Capitol Watch:  Death and Dignity, SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 9, 2006, at B6 (“Sen. Pat Thibaudeau, D-Seattle, has 
introduced a sensitive, reasoned Washington death with dignity bill (SB 6843).  It 
has yet to get a hearing in the Senate Health Care Committee, chaired by fellow 
Democrat Karen Keiser of Kent.”); Edwin Garcia, Assisted Suicide Campaign Back 
On, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 25, 2006; James J. Kilpatrick, Editorial, 10th 
Amendment Was Cure for This Ill, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 29, 2006, at A4 (noting 
a Tenth Amendment argument could have prevented the Gonzales Court from 
finding the way it did in Oregon, but that Congress surely has the federal commerce 
power to regulate interstate commerce in deadly drugs); Clifford M. Kulwin, 
Commentary:  People Die Differently These Days, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERV., Feb. 2, 
2006; Colin Nickerson, Suicide Groups Make Switzerland a Final Destination, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2006, at A12; Other States See Path in Ruling on Oregon’s 
Assisted Suicide Law, RELIGION NEWS SERV., Jan. 25, 2006; Robert Solomon, 
Scalia’s Flip-Flop on Assisted Suicide Is a Killer, CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2006, at 
23, 23; Sam Howe Verhovek, For Ex-Governor Who Advocates Right to Die, 
Political Is Personal, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2006, at A18. 
241 See Terry Eastland, Shameless in Seattle, AM. SPECTATOR, July 1994, at 57, 57. 
242 Id. at 58. 
243 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring).  Ninth Circuit Judge Tallman has also noted that “[t]he principle that 
state governments bear the primary responsibility for evaluating physician assisted 
suicide follows from our concept of federalism, which requires that state lawmakers, 
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debate appears to be an excellent paradigm for restrained 
federal power and an appropriate shift of weight back to the 
state side of the federalism balance. 
The PAD debate also illustrates the significant role that 
citizen initiatives play in this federalism balance.  Survey after 
survey has shown that a majority of Americans nationwide 
support patient self-determination for removing life support and 
for some form of physician assistance in dying.244  Despite this 
popularity, not a single state has passed legislation explicitly 
legalizing PAD in the thirty-plus years since Quinlan sensitized 
the American public to the issue. 
The influence of minority interest groups on key elected 
officials best explains why the traditional legislative process has 
failed.  The first section below illustrates how religious groups, 
such as the Catholic Church,245 have used pressure points not 
 
not the federal government, are the ‘primary regulators of professional [medical] 
conduct.’”  Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Conant 
v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 629 (9th Cir. 2002)) (alteration in original), aff’d sub nom., 
Gonzales v. Oregon 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
244 For example, the following polls all have shown a majority of adults support 
physician-assisted death:  (1) Gallup Poll of 1002 adults from May 8–11, 2006 
(showing majorities of 64–69% approval to 27–31% disapproval); (2) CBS        
News / New York Times polls of 1229 adults from June 1990 to January 2006 
(showing majorities of 46–58% approval to 36–45% disapproval); (3) Fox News 
survey of 900 registered voters in October 2005 (showing majorities of 48–52% 
approval to 37–39% disapproval); and (4) Harris Poll of 1010 adults from 1983 to 
April 2005 (showing majorities of 53–73% approval to 24–34% disapproval).  See 
National Polls on Euthanasia, http://www.euthanasiaprocon.org/poll.html (last 
visited July 17, 2007).  In addition, a Pew Research Center poll from November 9–
27, 2005, showed the impact of how questions are asked.  Id.  In 2005, 51% 
approved and 40% opposed “[m]aking it legal for doctors to give terminally ill 
patients the means to end their lives,” while 44% approved and 48% opposed in 
response to “[m]aking it legal for doctors to assist terminally ill patients in 
committing suicide.”  Id.  Similarly, an ABC News poll of 1021 adults in March 2002 
found closer margins for and against PAD depending on the question wording.  Id. 
245 Sources cited throughout this Article identify the “Catholic Church,” the 
“Roman Catholic Church,” the “U.S. Conference of Bishops” (the Catholic 
Church’s lobbying arm), and other organizations predominated by Catholics as the 
key opponents of PAD.  Consequently, this Article will sometimes use the term 
“Catholic Church” or “Church” generically to reference these organizations.  This 
Article also uses broader generic terms, such as “religious groups,” when others 
have joined the Catholic Church; however, it should be noted that not all religious 
groups oppose PAD.  For example, in June of 2006, the “United Church of Christ 
(UCC) moved to begin an in-depth study and discussion of supporting a terminally 
ill patient’s right to request medication to hasten death,” with a report due in 2009.  
UCC Calls for Groundbreaking Study of Aid in Dying, THOUGHT & ACTION 
(Compassion & Choices, Denver, Colo.), July 2007, http://www 
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only to block PAD legislation, but also to successfully push 
through legislation in two states that criminalize PAD. 
The second section below addresses how PAD has fared in 
the context of citizen initiatives.  Despite some failures, the 
citizen initiative process has been the only mechanism to 
successfully enact legislation reflecting what polls suggest is the 
preference of the majority of Americans with respect to PAD.  
In 1994, a majority of citizen voters adopted an initiative 
creating Oregon’s PAD statute.  Three years later, an even 
larger majority of citizen voters reaffirmed their support for 
PAD by refusing to repeal Oregon’s act even though religious 
group contributions to the repeal campaign exceeded those of 
PAD supporters more than six-to-one. 
Finally, the last section will show how the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s treatment of challenges to Oregon’s Act leaves open the 
opportunity for federalism to work:  states may resolve the 
controversial PAD issue by allowing Oregon to serve as a 
Brandeis laboratory for experimentation. 
1.  Action by State Legislators 
The traditional legislative process is often an ineffective forum 
for resolving some issues, particularly controversial social issues.  
In experimental areas, legislative inertia may be driven by 
controversy over a topic.  Because their voting records are public 
information, legislators often are unwilling to put controversial 
matters up for a vote, fearing repercussions from their political 
party or, when seeking reelection, from influential contributors. 
Because the issue is controversial, state legislatures have been 
unsuccessful in enacting any legislation legalizing PAD.  Instead, 
interest groups have been able to use the legislative pressure 
points not only to block efforts to legalize PAD but also to assert 
their influence through the legislative process to enact laws that 
penalize those who might act according to the majority view.  
Religious groups are leading this legislative campaign, and one 
commentator noted that “the Roman Catholic Church and its 
primary lobbying arm, the U.S. Conference of Bishops, has 
 
.compassionandchoices.org/newsletter/newsletter0707.html; see also HOEFLER, 
supra note 185, at 63–70 (describing the evolution of the Catholic Church’s position 
on PAD and the positions of other religions in the PAD debate).  For purposes of 
this Article, it is irrelevant which specific group is using the pressure point process, 
only that the group represents the view of a powerful minority interest. 
 948 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 895 
proved to be an interest group without rival on the right-to-die 
issue.”246 
Before Quinlan and Cruzan, states had no statutes on the 
books to address the new situation of a physician assisting a 
patient with death.  The issue only gained prominence when 
modern medicine made the artificial prolonging of life a more 
common occurrence.247  Although the Catholic Church fought to 
oppose living wills that allow patients to refuse medical 
treatment, it compromised on some legislation due to pressure 
that courts would invalidate any statute that overly restricted 
this fundamental right recognized in Cruzan.248 
California passed the first living will statute in 1976.249  The 
Quinlan case “created a window of opportunity” for the 
California legislature to pass its Natural Death Act even though 
proponents had introduced the bill before Quinlan was 
decided.250  Following California’s Natural Death Act of 1976, 
sixty-one other living will bills were introduced in forty-two 
states.251  Although the 1976 version of California’s Act did not 
address many of the issues doctors faced with end of life care, 
subsequent efforts to amend it have been caught in the 
legislative pressure-point web.  For example, a proposed 
 
246 Hoefler, supra note 27, at 163; see also Catholic Church Alters Tactics on 
Suicide Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1997, at B4 (explaining that although other 
religious organizations, such as the Mormon Church, were involved in the 1997 
effort to repeal Oregon’s Pro-PAD law, the Catholic Church remained “the 
dominant financial player” in that election); Gail Kinsey Hill & Ashbel S. Green, 
Groups Reveal Details of Financing to Fight Initiative Measures, OREGONIAN, Oct. 
11, 1994, at B5 (noting in the 1994 campaign for Oregon’s pro-PAD Measure 16, 
just three Catholic organizations contributed more than all of the proponent 
contributions combined, and overall opponents outspent proponents almost four to 
one). 
247 But note, however, some state efforts to legalize various forms of PAD date 
back to the early 1900s.  In 1906, for example, the Ohio legislature considered and 
rejected a bill that would have allowed doctors to end patients’ lives as comfortably 
as possible.  Glynn, supra note 150, at 349–50. 
248 See HENRY R. GLICK, THE RIGHT TO DIE 96 (1992). 
249 Id. at 99. 
250 Id. at 98. 
251 Id. at 99.  Glick argues that the Natural Death Act did not solve many of the 
issues faced by doctors in dying situations such as how to deal with patients who 
have not signed a directive, the determination of terminal cases, or patients in 
permanent vegetative states.  Id.  Doctors were still concerned about liability and 
seventy-five percent said they would continue to treat patients despite a request not 
to be treated.  Id. 
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amendment passed through the California legislature in 1988, 
but pro-life supporters were able to use the gubernatorial veto 
pressure point to stop that legislation.252 
The Florida Catholic Conference (“FCC”) took credit for 
lobbying to kill a living will bill that passed through a Senate 
committee in Florida in 1973 by “persuading conservative Senate 
leadership to block the bill” and to allow it to “die[] on the 
calendar a week before the end of the legislative session.”253  In 
subsequent years, the FCC was bolstered with information from 
the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and was able to 
ensure that similar bills died in committee or on the floor.254  
More than ten years later, only after pressure from court 
decisions that “promoted the right to die at a level well beyond 
that which state legislatures probably would approve if state 
Catholic conferences lobbied for restrictive provisions and 
participated actively in bill drafting,” did the FCC reconsider its 
position.255  Even when the Florida legislature passed a living will 
bill more closely tracking the rights outlined in Florida court 
holdings, the opponents were able to use the gubernatorial veto 
pressure point to prevent that bill from becoming law.256  Only a 
later compromise bill survived because it provided more 
limitations than the court holdings recognized and the FCC did 
not oppose it.257 
The California and Florida examples represent a pattern of 
effort by religious groups to restrict the right to refuse medical 
treatment.  Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized 
this right as constitutionally protected, these minority view 
groups have employed the traditional legislative process to enact 
 
252 Id. at 104.  The California Catholic Conference did not use its pressure point 
influence to stop the bill in the legislature because it was “better than more extreme 
alternatives, specifically the assisted suicide proposal endorsed by the Hemlock 
Society.”  Id.  However, the Committee on Moral Concerns and the California Pro-
Life Council convinced Republican Governor George Deukmejian to veto the law.  
Id. 
253 Id. at 107. 
254 Id. at 108. 
255 Id. at 113. 
256 Id. at 116 (noting Governor Bob Martinez, a conservative Republican, vetoed 
the legislation). 
257 Id. at 117. 
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laws to minimize exercise of that right.258  Furthermore, because 
the Supreme Court failed to recognize a constitutional right to 
die in Quill and Glucksberg, these religious groups have been 
even more effective at blocking statutes attempting to legalize 
PAD. 
Several bills to enact statutes that specifically would authorize 
PAD have been proposed in state legislatures, but none has 
been successful.259  Many of these efforts started in the early 
1990s and continue today.  State legislators in Connecticut, Iowa, 
Maine, New Hampshire, Virginia, and Washington have all 
submitted bills supportive of PAD, but opponents prevented this 
legislation from becoming law.260  Two Wisconsin legislators 
have sponsored pro-PAD bills for more than ten years, but they 
have never gotten one to a vote.261  Similarly in 2007, Arizona, 
Hawaii, and Vermont all considered bills to legalize PAD, but 
none of these were able to advance to a full vote.262 
Although in some instances specific religious groups have 
been prominent in their opposition, in other situations, their 
impact on the pressure points of the legislative process may be 
less obvious as they have “lowered their public profiles and 
played down the moral arguments that dominated their [earlier] 
effort[s].”263  Still, recent attempts to pass a pro-PAD law in the 
California legislature illustrate that the Catholic Church remains 
actively involved in blocking such measures. 
 
258 Id. at 119 (“The struggle for the last word on the right to die shifts back and 
forth between the courts and the legislature [in Florida] . . . . The strategy of the 
FCC, which has been the most prominent force in Florida’s right to die politics, is to 
resist enlarging the right to die until expansive judicial policy is expected.  Then, the 
FCC compromises on legislative measures that do not go as far as the appellate 
courts.”).  Furthermore, when the legislature goes beyond its comfort level, the 
FCC further “seeks to limit [the legislation’s] impact by lobbying administrative 
agencies for restrictive rules.”  Id.  For additional examples of Catholic Church 
interference with living-will legislation in Massachusetts, see id. at 120, and in 
Pennsylvania, see Hoefler, supra note 27, at 164. 
259 Colburn, supra note 10 (“In all, 18 states have seen ballot measures proposed 
or bills introduced on assisted suicide.”); see also Tromble, supra note 233, at 1672–
73. 
260 See Jimenez, supra note 155. 
261 Vollmar, May 2007 Developments, supra note 10. 
262 See id. 
263 Catholic Church Alters Tactics on Suicide Law, supra note 246. 
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California legislators introduced AB 374, a bill that would 
legalize PAD, in January of 2007.264  When AB 374 moved 
forward by a 7-3 vote in the California Assembly Judiciary 
Committee in April of 2007, Catholic Cardinal Roger Mahoney 
“charg[ed] supporters of the bill with participating in a ‘culture 
of death’ and the legislation with being against ‘God’s law and 
God’s plan.’”265  The Assembly Speaker, Fabian Núñez, is a 
Catholic, and the Church asserted pressure directly at him and 
other Catholics in the California Assembly, encouraging parish 
priests to distribute “flyers calling Núñez a ‘killer,’ and 
threatening to withhold the sacrament of communion from any 
lawmaker voting for the Compassionate Choices Act.”266  
Support for AB 374 waned, and the bill was never brought to a 
vote.267 
Aside from blocking legislation that would support PAD, 
opponents have been able to influence the legislative process to 
further discourage its use by doctors.  Without majority support 
to pass legislation specifically prohibiting PAD, individuals and 
 
264 Vollmar, May 2007 Developments, supra note 10.  The California legislature 
has attempted to pass PAD legislation in several sessions, but each time it was 
blocked.  For example, in 1999, the California legislature tried two times to pass 
PAD measures.  Even with over seventy percent of the public supporting the 
measures, bills did not get put up for a vote.  Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent 
Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (June 1999), http://www.willamette 
.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/1999-06.pdf.  There was a renewed effort to change California’s 
assisted-suicide statute in January 2006 following the Supreme Court decision in 
Gonzales v. Oregon.  The California state legislature introduced AB 651 in January, 
and revised the bill in June 2006, but this legislation also failed to get through.  See 
Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (July 2007), 
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/2006-07.pdf.  Therefore, the current law in 
California, as written in the California Penal Code, states that “[e]very person who 
deliberately aids, or advises, or encourages another to commit suicide, is guilty of a 
felony.”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 2006). 
265 California AB 374 Supporters Stand Up for Religious Freedom, THOUGHT & 
ACTION (Compassion & Choices, Denver, Colo.), Apr. 2007, http://www 
.compassionandchoices.org/newsletter/newsletter0407.html. 
266 Barbara Coombs Lee, On My Mind, THOUGHT & ACTION (Compassion & 
Choices, Denver, Colo.), Apr. 2007, http://www.compassionandchoices.org/ 
newsletter/newsletter0407.html. 
267 Vogel, supra note 154 (noting the bill’s authors, knowing that they did not 
have the support to pass the legislation, failed to bring it for a vote).  The Catholic 
Church also blocked prior bills to legalize PAD, such as AB 1592, which was 
attacked by the Roman Catholic Church in hearings before the Assembly Judiciary 
Committee in 1999.  Gladstone, supra note 155. 
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interest groups who opposed the practice turned to age-old 
assisted-suicide statutes. 
Every state except Hawaii, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming has 
addressed assisted suicide in some way, either through the 
common law or through statute.268  Historically, these statutes 
 
268 Before 1996, thirty-three states criminalized assisted suicide by statute.  Kevin 
M. Stansbury, Note, Physician Assisted Suicide-Due Process, The Right to Die, 
Equal Protection and Slippery Slopes, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 623, 637 n.132 
(1996).  This list, compiled by Stansbury, includes:  ALASKA STAT. § 
11.41.100(a)(1)(B) (1994) (first degree murder); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1103(3) (1989) (manslaughter); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (1987) 
(manslaughter); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1999) (separate crime, felony); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (1986) (manslaughter); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 53a-56(a)(2) (West 1994) (manslaughter in the second degree); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1994) (separate crime, felony); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 
1982) (separate crime, felony); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (1995) (separate crime, 
felony); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702(1)(b) (1993) (manslaughter); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. § 5/12-31 (West 1995) (separate crime, felony if suicide is successful, 
misdemeanor if suicide unsuccessful); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5 (West 1994) 
(separate crime, felony); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1992) (separate crime, 
felony); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12 (1996) (manslaughter); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (1993) (separate crime, felony); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW 
§ 3-102 (LexisNexis 1995) (reckless endangerment); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 
(West 1994) (separate crime, felony); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-3-49 (West 1994) 
(separate crime, felony); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.023(2) (1992) (voluntary 
manslaughter); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1993) (separate crime, felony); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1989) (separate crime, felony); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 
(1994) (separate crime, felony); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:11-6 (West 1994) (separate 
crime, felony); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (West 1994) (separate crime, felony); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1987) (separate crime, felony); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 12.1-16-04 (1993) (separate crime, felony); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 813 
(West 1993) (separate crime, felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2505 (1993) (separate 
crime, felony if suicide is successful, misdemeanor if suicide attempt is 
unsuccessful); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1090 (1999) (misdemeanor); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 22-16-37 (1993) (separate crime, felony); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 
(1995) (separate crime, felony); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (Vernon 1994) 
(separate crime, felony if suicide is successful, misdemeanor if suicide attempt is 
unsuccessful); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988) (separate crime, 
felony); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982) (separate crime, felony). 
 Since 1996, four additional states have criminalized physician-assisted suicide.  
Glynn, supra note 150, at 333 n.27.  These state laws include:  IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 
707A.2, 707A.3 (West 1997) (separate crime, felony); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
216.302 (West 1994) (separate crime, felony); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027 
(West 1992) (separate crime, felony); and R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-60-1, 11-60-3 
(1997) (separate crime, felony). 
 The District of Columbia has not addressed the issue, while Alabama, Idaho, 
Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, and Vermont only provide a common law 
remedy.  See State Laws on Assisted-Suicide, http://www.euthanasiaprocon.org/ 
statelaws.htm (last visited July 19, 2007). 
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arose to address “suicide” situations, not PAD.269  Some 
jurisdictions held that because suicide was not a crime, aiding in 
it also was not criminal.270  Other jurisdictions considered motive 
and found liability only if the one assisting intended to selfishly 
benefit from the death of another.271  The Model Penal Code 
suggests that aiding in suicide will be criminal homicide only if 
the party assisting caused the suicide “by force, duress or 
deception.”272  Commentaries on this section of the Code 
explained that liability is limited to purposeful conduct because 
merely creating the risk that another will commit suicide would 
cast the net of liability too wide.273  None of the Code sections 
specifically addressed involvement by a physician. 
Despite the fact that these statutes were not enacted to 
address the distinct situations doctors faced with patients whose 
deaths were now being prolonged by modern medicine, 
prosecutors in some states began to use the assisted-suicide 
statutes on the books to deter PAD.  Although states have 
brought unsuccessful actions,274 Michigan, California, and 
Kansas indicted physicians for assisting in suicide in violation of 
state laws.275  Furthermore, physicians and patients who feared 
potential sanctions under the assisted-suicide statutes were the 
primary instigators of litigation challenging these statutes in 
Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, New York, and 
Washington.276 
 
269 See supra note 10 and accompanying text for discussion of confusion created 
by using the term “suicide” to address PAD; see also Cohen et al., supra note 153, at 
89 (“To avoid ambiguity in our survey, instead of ‘physician-assisted suicide,’ we 
used the phrase ‘prescription of medication . . . or the counseling of an ill patient so 
he or she may use an overdose to end his or her own life.’”). 
270 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt. 5, at 100 n.22 (1980). 
271 See, e.g., id. § 210.5 cmt. 5, at 101 n.24. 
272 Id. § 210.5(1); see also id. § 210.5 cmt. 5, at 100 (“[T]he interests in the sanctity 
of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one 
who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of another, even though 
the act may be accomplished with the consent, or at the request, of the suicide 
victim.”); DAVID C. BRODY ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 93 (2001). 
273 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt. 5, at 102. 
274 See, e.g., State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 224 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998); People v. 
Kevorkian, 519 N.W.2d 890, 890 (Mich. 1994). 
275 See, e.g., infra notes 291–96. 
276 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707–08 (1997); Vacco v. 
Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 796–97 (1996); Sampson v. Alaska, 31 P.3d 88, 90 (Alaska 2001); 
Sanderson v. People, 12 P.3d 851, 852 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000); Krischer v. McIver, 
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In an effort to restrict PAD, a few states have modified their 
assisted-suicide laws to specifically mention health care 
providers.  Virginia has enacted a law that subjects licensed 
health care providers who have engaged in assisting suicide or 
attempted suicide to the possibility of license revocation or civil 
liability.277  Ohio amended its assisted-suicide statute in 2006 to 
permit injunctions against health care providers who may be 
attempting to assist with a suicide.278 
In the opposite direction, several states responded after the 
Cruzan decision by modifying their assisted-suicide statutes to 
include specific provisions to protect health care providers.  
After Cruzan, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, and Louisiana all 
amended their laws.  Originally, these laws did not specifically 
address health care providers.  After 1990, legislators in these 
states amended their assisted-suicide statutes to exclude from 
prosecution health care providers acting under a living will.279 
Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
and Tennessee all went a step further by attempting to address 
the gray area between PAD and palliative care that may hasten 
death.  These states now provide exemptions from the assisted-
suicide statutes for physicians or other health care workers who 
may cause death while alleviating pain so long as their intent was 
not to cause death knowingly.280 
 
697 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1997); People v. Kevorkian, 519 N.W.2d 890, 890 (Mich. 
1994). 
277 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-662.1(D) (1999) (“A licensed health care provider who 
assists or attempts to assist a suicide shall be considered to have engaged in 
unprofessional conduct for which his certificate or license to provide health care 
services in the Commonwealth shall be suspended or revoked by the licensing 
authority.”). 
278 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3795.02 (West 2006). 
279 GEORGIA CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (West 1995); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-
31 (West 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2.5(a) (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:32.12 (1995).  Note that “living wills” are also sometimes referred to as 
advanced directives or advanced health care directives. 
280 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM LAW § 3-
103 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 605.215(3)(2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
1090(C) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216(b) (2006).  Oklahoma’s statute is 
somewhat ambiguous; it is titled “Assisted Suicide Prevention Act of 1998,” and on 
its face prohibits PAD, yet it also has a very broad exception for palliative care, 
placing it on the protective side for doctors.  OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3141.4 (2006).  
Similarly, in Maryland in 1998, the Maryland Catholic Conference began working 
with hospice organizations and other groups to introduce a bill that would outlaw 
physician-assisted suicide.  Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-
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Finally, not only have opponents been successful in blocking 
legislation legalizing PAD, they also have pushed their cause to 
the other extreme, attempting to pass legislation specifically 
targeting doctors who respond to patients’ requests for PAD.  
Since 1996, Alabama, Arkansas, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
and Vermont have had bills introduced that would specifically 
criminalize PAD.  None have passed.281  However, in Rhode 
 
Assisted Suicide (Feb. 1998), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/1998-02.pdf 
[hereinafter Vollmar, Feb. 1998 Developments].  A bill banning physician-assisted 
suicide and imposing harsh criminal penalties of prison time and fines passed both 
legislative houses and was signed into law by Governor Glendening on May 27, 
1999.  Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide 
(June 1998), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/1998-06.pdf.  However, the 
palliative care provision provides some protection for Maryland physicians. 
281 Alabama:  “In February 2000, the Alabama Senate passed Senate Bill 8, which 
would make assisted suicide a Class C felony punishable by up to 10 years in prison.  
However, the bill died in the House.”  Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in 
Physician-Assissted Suicide (Nov. 2000), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/ 
2000-11.pdf [hereinafter Vollmar, Nov. 2007 Developments]. 
 Arkansas:  “On February 10, 1999, Arkansas state representatives passed a bill 
that would make it a felony for a physician to carry out a medical procedure or 
prescribe drugs for the purpose of ending a patient’s life.  The bill was sent to the 
Senate on a vote of 89 to 3 . . . .” But, the bill was never enacted.  See Vollmar, Mar. 
1999 Developments, supra note 232. 
 North Carolina:  On February 20, 2003, North Carolina State “Senators Jim 
Forrester and Bill Purcell, both physicians, filed S.B. 145, which would make 
assisted suicide by a licensed health care professional a Class D felony.  The bill was 
referred to committee . . . .” but did not pass.  Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent 
Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (June 2003), http://www.willamette 
.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/2003-06.pdf. 
Subsequently, the Executive Council of the Elder Law Section of the North 
Carolina Bar Association adopted a resolution “oppos[ing] enactment of S. 
145 or any other felony law that purports to bar ‘assisted suicide,’” 
primarily due to concern that the bill might affect the quality of end-of-life 
care.  The bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee and was not 
considered further in the 2003–04 session.  The Health Law Section and the 
Estate Planning Section also voted to oppose the bill, and the North 
Carolina Bar Association’s Board of Governors voted in April 2004 to 
oppose it when reintroduced in the 2004–05 legislative session. 
Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (Oct. 
2004), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/2004-10.pdf (alteration in original) 
(noting the bill did not make it out of committee). 
 North Dakota:  “Senator Ralph Kilzer . . . introduced a bill in the North Dakota 
legislature that would revoke a health care provider’s license for assisting in a 
suicide and would make the provider liable to pay damages in any potential 
lawsuits.”  Vollmar, Mar. 1999 Developments, supra note 232 (the bill did not pass). 
 Vermont:  In February 2003 H. 318 was introduced in the Vermont legislature to 
criminalize PAD.  The Senate and House Health and Welfare Committees failed to 
bring the bill for a vote in both 2003 and when reintroduced in 2004.  See Valerie J. 
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Island and Michigan, legislators specifically made it a crime for a 
health care provider to “assist” in suicide.282 
In 1996, the Rhode Island legislature considered one bill 
making PAD a felony and another bill that would legalize PAD.  
Although Rhode Island has the largest Catholic constituency in 
 
Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (June 2005), 
http://www.willamette.edu/ wucl/pdf/pas/2005-06.pdf. 
282 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027 (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-3 
(2006).  The Rhode Island statute states: 
An individual or licensed health care practitioner who with the purpose of 
assisting another person to commit suicide knowingly: 
 (1) Provides the physical means by which another person commits or 
attempts to commit suicide; or 
 (2) Participates in a physical act by which another person commits or 
attempts to commit suicide is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be 
punished by imprisonment for up to ten (10) years, by a fine of up to ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000) or both. 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-3. 
The Michigan statute provides: 
A person who has knowledge that another person intends to commit or 
attempt to commit suicide and who intentionally does either of the 
following is guilty of criminal assistance to suicide, a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than 4 years or by a fine of not more than 
$2,000.00, or both: 
 (a) Provides the physical means by which the other person attempts or 
commits suicide. 
 (b) Participates in a physical act by which the other person attempts or 
commits suicide. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027.  The current version of this statute has both 
an advance directive and palliative care exception.  See id. §§ 752.1027(2), (3).  
However, the court held that a similar exception in the pre-1993 version of the 
statute did not apply to Dr. Kevorkian because he administered medication 
designed to cause death.  See People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 302 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2001).  The pre-1993 version of the statute read as follows: 
A licensed health care professional who administers, prescribes, or 
dispenses medications or procedures to relieve a person’s pain or 
discomfort, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or increase the 
risk of death, is not guilty of assistance to suicide under this section unless 
the medications or procedures are knowingly and intentionally 
administered, prescribed, or dispensed to cause death. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027(3) (West 1992).  Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 6-5-15 
(West 1998) (does not explicitly mention health care providers, but makes it illegal 
for any individual to hold himself or herself out as offering that he or she will 
intentionally and actively assist another person in the commission of suicide and 
committing any overt act to further that purpose); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 
(1994) (does not specifically address healthcare providers, but makes providing the 
means of suicide a felony). 
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the United States,283 Senator Roney, a PAD advocate noted, 
“We are here today as legislators.  We are not here as Catholics, 
Jews or Protestants . . . . We do not have the luxury of 
attempting to impose our religious views on others.”284  Despite 
Senator Roney’s pleas, the Rhode Island legislators passed the 
anti-PAD legislation, “signal[ing their] full sympathy with 
Catholic Church representatives and other opponents of assisted 
suicide who packed a third-floor State House room for the 
hearing [on a bill making PAD a felony].”285 
Michigan is a special case.  Although many would argue that 
Michigan doctor Jack Kevorkian’s actions did more harm than 
good in the PAD debate, no discussion of the topic would be 
complete without mentioning his involvement.286  From 1990 to 
1998, Dr. Kevorkian claimed to have assisted in over 130 
suicides,287 three using his “suicide machine.”288  After early 
attempts to charge Kevorkian with murder under the existing 
assisted-suicide law failed,289 the Michigan General Assembly 
made its statute more restrictive in 1992.290  The statute states 
that any person is guilty of a felony if that person, with 
knowledge of another person’s intent or attempt to commit 
suicide, provides “physical means” or “physical acts” to aid the 
suicide.291 
 
283 GLICK, supra note 248, at 124 (“[T]he Catholic church has direct access and 
enormous influence in the legislature, and all observers and participants agree that 
it is able to block or postpone legislation that it opposes. . . . [T]he Catholic 
constituency of Massachusetts is the second largest in the United States–the 
population is over 50 percent Catholic, second only to Rhode Island.”).  “As in 
other states, the Massachusetts Catholic Conference has been the main and the 
most powerful opponent to the right to die . . . .”  Id. at 120. 
284 Rowland, supra note 163. 
285 Id. 
286 For more detailed discussion on the impact of Kevorkian actions see generally 
ELIZABETH ATWOOD GAILEY, WRITE TO DEATH (2003); George J. Annas, The 
“Right to Die” in America:  Sloganeering from Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and 
Kevorkian, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 875, 891–92 (1996); Persels, supra note 183; Branigan, 
supra note 183;. 
287 See Ron Dzwonkowski, Kevorkian Timeline, DET. FREE PRESS, Dec. 13, 2006, 
at B6. 
288 Persels, supra note 183, at 95. 
289 See id. 
290 See Catherine L. Annas, Irreversible Error:  The Power and Prejudice of 
Female Genital Mutilation, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 325, 340 (1996). 
291 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027 (West 2006).  Michigan’s assisted-suicide 
statute was enacted in February of 1993.  It was not repealed after six months as 
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After the statute was amended, Dr. Kevorkian assisted in 
three more suicides and was indicted under the new law.292  On 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the statute was 
properly enacted and that the imposition of criminal penalties on 
an individual who assists in the suicide of another does not 
violate the U.S. Constitution.293  In addition, Kevorkian went a 
step further when he administered a lethal injection to a patient 
with terminal cancer, an event that was videotaped and later 
aired on CBS’s 60 Minutes.294  Kevorkian’s attempt to enjoin 
prosecution failed after the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the 
state’s assisted-suicide statute.295  As a result, Dr. Kevorkian was 
convicted of second degree murder and served over eight years 
of his ten to twenty-five year prison sentence.296  He was paroled 
in June of 2007 for health reasons.297 
Assisted-suicide statutes that threaten sanctions for physicians 
and criminalize decisions about patient care have a chilling effect 
on doctors.298  Thus, the inability of state legislatures to resolve 
 
provided for in subsection 5 because the Michigan Supreme Court found it was 
validly enacted and did not violate the U.S. Constitution.  People v. Kevorkian, 527 
N.W.2d 714, 719 (Mich. 1994). 
292 Branigan, supra note 183, at 962–63. 
293 Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 716. 
294 Jail Time for Dr. Kevorkian, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1999, at A30 (noting Dr. 
Kevorkian was acquitted in the 1994 killing of Thomas Hyde; however, after CBS 
aired portions of a video depicting Dr. Kevorkian assisting in the suicide of Thomas 
Youk, Dr. Kevorkian was again indicted and this time convicted of second degree 
murder and distribution of controlled substances). 
295 Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. 1152, 1171–72 (E.D. Mich. 1997) 
(following the Michigan Supreme Court precedent that there was no Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest in assisted suicide, that Michigan’s statute did not 
violate Equal Protection, and that Michigan common law was not unconstitutionally 
vague on the topic). 
296 See Kevorkian Leaving Prison in June, DENVER POST, Dec. 14, 2006, at 2A. 
297 Prison officials in Lansing, Michigan, decided to grant him parole after more 
than eight years behind bars.  Id.  They considered seventy-eight-year-old 
Kevorkian’s health and the unlikelihood that he would pose a danger to society if 
freed.  Id. 
298 See Press Release, Edward L. Langston, Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA:  Justice 
Served for Dr. Pou (July 24, 2007), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/ 
17849.html.  In a press release after a grand jury refused to indict Dr. Anna Pou, the 
AMA stated, “The AMA continues to be very concerned about criminalizing 
decisions about patient care . . . .”  Id.  Dr. Pou was charged with injecting four 
elderly patients with “lethal cocktails” during the August 2005 Katrina storm.  Mary 
Foster, No Indictment for Doctoring Katrina Deaths, DENVER POST, July 25, 2007, 
at 9A.  Some charged that Dr. Pou administered the injections as mercy killings, but 
the doctor said the patients wished to die naturally and she did all she could to 
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the PAD issue has made it “difficult for clinicians to deliver 
care”299 or to prescribe what they believe is the most humane 
and appropriate treatment for their patients.300 
2.  Action by Citizen Initiatives 
While pro-PAD supporters pushed the debate in legislatures 
and the courts, they were most successful by using the citizen 
initiative process.  The citizen initiative process has been the 
only mechanism for enacting legislation reflecting what polls 
suggest is the preference of the majority of American citizens:  
the legalization of PAD.  Oregon’s Act was such a citizen 
initiative and currently represents the only U.S. law legalizing 
PAD.301  Aside from Oregon’s success, four other states 
attempted similar initiatives. 
California was the first to try the initiative route with a 1988 
attempt.  This ballot measure, intended to aid those in persistent 
vegetative comas and those with AIDS and terminal cancer, did 
not garner enough signatures to make it on the ballot.302  In 1992, 
California tried again.303  This time, proponents were able to get 
their end-of-life measure on the California ballot as Proposition 
161.304  Proposition 161 was leading in the polls just days before 
 
“make them comfortable.”  UCC Calls for Groundbreaking Study of Aid in Dying, 
supra note 245. 
299 Adam Nossiter, Grand Jury Won’t Indict Doctor in Hurricane Deaths, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2007, at A10 (quoting Dr. Anna Pou).  On July 24, 2007, an Orleans 
Parish grand jury refused to indict Dr. Pou on any charges.  Id.  The American 
Medical Association has released its statement praising the grand jury’s decision.  
Id. 
300 For example, the California State Medical Board revoked Dr. Harold Luke’s 
medical license when the doctor increased a seventy-six-year-old man’s morphine 
drip tenfold.  Id.  The Board first concluded this action hastened the patient’s death. 
Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-Assisted Suicide (July 2006), 
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/2006-07.pdf.  On reconsideration, however, 
Dr. Luke argued he “intended only to make his patient’s last days as painless and 
comfortable as possible,” and the Board reinstated the doctor’s license and reduced 
the penalty to a public reprimand for inadequate record keeping.  Id. 
301 See supra note 240. 
302 See Joan Beck, Californians May Be Invited to Vote on a Right to Die, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 21, 1988, at 23C. 
303 See Tom Paulson, No to Aid in Dying–But Fight Goes On, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 7, 1991, at A9. 
304 Proponents of Proposition 161 added safeguards to the initiative including 
family notification without the ability to veto, reporting requirements, psychological 
evaluation, and a waiting period before the request would be granted.  Id. 
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the election,305 but the Catholic Church and other foes “spent 
more than $2.8 million on a hard-hitting campaign . . . . The 
measure’s backers spent one-tenth that amount and saw public 
opinion swing from 75% favoring the initiative in some 
preelection polls to an election-day defeat of 54% to 46%.”306  
John Brooke, president of Americans for Death with Dignity, 
noted, “We can’t match them financially.”307 
In 1991, the citizens of Washington State also voted on a PAD 
initiative.  The initiative, I-119, sought to give the terminally ill 
the right to physician assistance in speeding their deaths.308  
Initially, I-119 showed great promise of successfully passing; 
even a conference of clergy, the Pacific Northwest Conference of 
the United Methodist Church, endorsed it.309  However, 
opponents again weighed in with an aggressive campaign, and 
the initiative failed in a fifty-four to forty-six percent margin on 
November 5, 1991.310 
 
305 As of November 2, 1992, a telephone poll showed support of the initiative was 
forty-seven percent for, forty percent against, and thirteen percent undecided.  
California:  Voters Favor “Death with Dignity” Prop., AM. HEALTH LINE, Nov. 2, 
1992. 
306 Bailey, supra note 92 (“People felt that the [California Medical Association] 
and the Catholic Church were the reason Proposition 161 was defeated . . . .”); see 
also California:  Voters Reject Health Care Propositions, AM. HEALTH LINE, Nov. 4, 
1992. (noting fifty-four percent against, forty-six percent for the California Death 
with Dignity Act); Polls Show, supra note 144. 
307 Bailey, supra note 92. 
308 Rob Carson, Washington’s I-119, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 1992, 
at 7, 8.  It also would expand the definition of terminally ill to include coma and 
persistent vegetative state.  Id. at 8; see also Paulson, supra note 303.   The bill was 
in response to Cruzan and sought to clearly define a patient’s ability to refuse 
medical treatment even to the point of ending life.  See William Bole, Right-to-Die 
Debate Zips Past Cruzan Case, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 22, 1991, at 
D6. 
309 Diego Ribadeneira, Euthanasia Support Is Spreading, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, June 22, 1991, at D6. 
310 Carson, supra note 308, at 7; Paulson, supra note 303.  I-119 contained many 
safeguards to prevent acts such as euthanasia from occurring, including requiring 
that the request be voluntary and in writing from a “conscious, competent” patient 
and that the request be certified by “two physicians, one of them the attending 
physician, . . . that the patient had six months or less to live.”  Carson, supra note 
308, at 9.  Yet reasons for the failure, voiced by the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 
concerned the lack of safeguards including:  (1) it did not define competency, (2) it 
did not require patients seeking to end their lives to be Washington residents, (3) it 
required no special training required of physicians to assist patients in dying, and (4) 
it contained no safeguards for the families or loved ones of the person seeking to 
die.  Thomas J. Murphy, Initiative 119–A Real Nightmare, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 
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In the fall of 1998, Michigan voters addressed the PAD issue 
in Proposal B.311  Proposal B would have legalized the 
“prescription of a lethal dose of medication to terminally ill, 
competent, informed adults in order to commit suicide.”312  The 
measure failed by a significant margin.313  “Proposal B 
supporters blamed the downturn [of support] on an intense 
multimillion-dollar ad campaign by a coalition of health care, 
religious and civil rights organizations” that raised more than 
five million dollars in contributions.314  In contrast, advocates of 
Proposal B had raised only $300,000 and produced one television 
ad.315 
In 2000, Maine made the most recent attempt to pass a ballot 
initiative to give people the right to seek physician assistance in 
death.316  Following the Maine legislature’s rejection in February 
1998 of a bill that would have legalized physician-assisted 
suicide, supporters launched the PRO 916 campaign collecting 
petition signatures to put the proposal on the ballot in 2000.317  
Although the margin of votes was very close, PRO 916 failed to 
pass.318 
Oregon alone successfully passed a measure legalizing PAD. 
In 1994, Oregon voters approved Oregon’s Death with Dignity 
 
26, 1991, at C9.  Some sectors also feared the initiative was euthanasia in disguise. 
Death with Dignity–An Attempt to Confuse and Deceive by Hemlock Society, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 24, 1990, at A9. 
311 Proposal B was in response to a statute enacted by the Michigan legislature 
that banned assisted suicide.  The Proposal would instead have made assisted 
suicide legal.  Michigan:  Poll Shows Suicide Measure Heading to Defeat, AM. 
HEALTH LINE, Oct. 26, 1998 (noting as early as October 1998, fifty-four percent of 
voters opposed the measure, forty percent supported it, and six percent were 
unsure). 
312 Michigan Voters Soundly Reject Physician Assisted Suicide, CNN.COM, Nov. 3, 
1998, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/11/03/election/ballots/  
assisted.suicide/index.html. 
313 See id. 
314 Id. 
315 Id.  Some also believe that Dr. Kevorkian’s more aggressive euthanasia 
activities also contributed to sway public opinion against the measure.  See, e.g., 
Joyce Howard Price, Maine Voters Say No to Assisted Suicide Among Ballot Issues, 
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at A15. 
316 Maine:  Voters Narrowly Defeat Assisted Suicide Measure, AM. HEALTH LINE, 
Nov. 8, 2000; see also Price, supra note 315. 
317 Vollmar, Nov. 2007 Developments, supra note 281. 
318 The vote was 330,671 (51.3%) against and 313,303 (48.7%) for the measure.  
Id. 
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Act by a margin of two percent.319  Oregon’s Act exempts from 
civil or criminal liability state-licensed physicians who, in 
compliance with the Act’s specific safeguards, dispense or 
prescribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request of a terminally 
ill patient.320 
A number of physicians, patients, and residential treatment 
facilities challenged Oregon’s Act and were able to obtain an 
injunction staying its implementation based on potential 
violations of their freedom of association, freedom of religion, 
due process, and equal protection rights.321  However, the Ninth 
Circuit vacated for lack of standing and ultimately lifted the 
injunction in February of 1997.322  Just about a week after the 
Ninth Circuit lifted the injunction, Oregon’s Act survived an 
initiative effort to repeal it.323 
The Catholic Church was heavily involved in both the 1994 
and 1997 initiative campaigns.  In 1994, opponents outspent 
proponents of the initiative almost four to one.324  “[T]he 
Catholic church remain[ed] the dominant financial player.  In 
1994, almost half of the $1.5 million spent in opposition to 
legalization of doctor-assisted suicide came from Catholic 
dioceses and Catholic hospitals in Oregon and elsewhere.”325 
In 1997, Church leaders tried to lower their public profiles:  
“We didn’t want this to backfire on us as it did in 1994, when 
they said this is the Catholic Church, or the religious right, or 
 
319 See Michael C. Dorf, FindLaw Forum:  Telling States What to Do in Cases of 
Physician-Assisted Suicide, CNN.COM, Nov. 19, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ 
LAW/11/columns/fl.dorf.assisted.suicide.11.19/. 
320 Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.885 (2007). 
321 See Lee v. State, 869 F. Supp. 1491, 1491 (D. Or. 1994).  The District Court 
imposed a preliminary injunction in this case.  The next year, the court issued a 
permanent injunction in Lee v. State, 891 F. Supp. 1439, 1439 (D. Or. 1995).  The 
plaintiffs alleged violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, their First Amendment rights of freedom to exercise 
religion and to associate, and their statutory rights under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990.  Lee, 869 F. Supp. at 1493. 
322 Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1997). 
323 Vollmar, Feb. 1998 Developments, supra note 280. 
324 Hill & Green, supra note 246. 
325 Catholic Church Alters Tactics on Suicide Law, supra note 246; see also Hill & 
Green, supra note 246 (noting approximately one month from the end of the 
campaign, supporters of Measure 16 had raised only $260,056 in contrast to 
opponent’s war chest of $1,034,000). 
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religious extremists, or conservatives.”326  Despite its lower 
profile, the Catholic Church ramped up its opposition.  In the 
1997 campaign, the opponents to PAD outspent the supporters 
almost six to one.  Catholic organizations contributed about half 
of the over $2.3 million raised by the opposition.327  Despite the 
significant imbalance of funding, Oregon voters rejected the 
repeal efforts and renewed their support for PAD by a margin of 
twenty percent.328 
3.  Federal Affronts to Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act 
In 2001, Attorney General Ashcroft issued an interpretive 
rule (“Directive”) declaring physicians in violation of the 
Controlled Substances Act for prescribing lethal doses of 
controlled substances in PAD situations.329  Ashcroft’s Directive 
pitted the Controlled Substances Act, a federal law not 
specifically addressing PAD, against Oregon’s Act, which did 
specifically address the issue.  The physicians were licensed, and 
the drugs were ones they were allowed to prescribe under the 
Controlled Substances Act.  Although lethal doses of these 
prescriptions were legal under Oregon’s Act, Ashcroft declared 
that prescribing them in PAD circumstances was “not a 
legitimate medical practice” under the Controlled Substances 
Act.330  Thus, under the Directive, specific conduct authorized by 
Oregon’s Act could render a practitioner’s federal registration 
 
326 Catholic Church Alters Tactics on Suicide Law, supra note 246. 
327 Id.  In both campaigns, the PAD opponents significantly outspent the 
proponents.  For support of the repeal, “[c]ampaign funds raised as of 9/24/97 
amounted to $2.25 million, including $800,000 from Catholic archdioceses around 
the country, $250,000 from the U.S. Catholic Conference, and $100,000 from 
Oregon Right to Life.”  Valerie J. Vollmar, Recent Developments in Physician-
Assisted Deaths (Oct. 1997), http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/pdf/pas/1997-10.pdf.  
“Opponents of Measure 51 include[d] Governor Kitzhaber (an emergency room 
physician) and a group of physicians known as Physicians for Death with Dignity.  
[Opponents’] [c]ampaign funds raised as of 9/24/97 amounted to $370,000, including 
$150,000 each from a local millionaire and international philanthropist George 
Soros.”  Id. 
328 OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON’S 
DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 6 (2006), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/ 
pas/docs/year8.pdf.  The total votes against repeal were 666,275, while the total for 
repeal were 445,830.  Official Results State Measure No. 51 (Nov. 4, 1997), 
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov497/other.info/m51abst.htm. 
329 Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 
56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001), invalidated by Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
330 Id. 
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inconsistent with the public interest, and therefore subject to 
possible suspension or revocation.331  The Directive specifically 
targeted health care practitioners in Oregon and instructed the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration to enforce this 
determination regardless of whether state law authorized or 
permitted such conduct by practitioners.332 
A physician, a pharmacist, several terminally ill patients, and 
the State of Oregon filed suit seeking an injunction against the 
Directive the day it was published.333  On appeal, in Oregon v. 
Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 
Ashcroft Directive was unlawful and unenforceable because it 
violated the plain language of the Controlled Substances Act, 
contravened Congress’s express legislative intent, and 
overstepped the bounds of the U.S. Attorney General’s statutory 
authority.334  The court found that the Controlled Substances 
Act was enacted to combat drug abuse, and that “to the extent 
that it authorize[d] the federal government to make decisions 
about the practice of medicine, those decisions [were] delegated 
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, not to the 
Attorney General.”335  Ashcroft’s successor, Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In January 2006, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Gonzales v. Oregon.336  In a six-to-three 
opinion, the Gonzales majority held that the U.S. Attorney 
General could not prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated 
drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide under Oregon’s Death 
 
331 See id. 
332 Id.  Just three years before, then Attorney General Janet Reno had refused to 
challenge physicians practicing under Oregon’s Act, deciding not to “displace the 
states as the primary regulators of the medical profession, or to override a state’s 
determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical practice in the absence of a 
federal law prohibiting that practice.”  Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., to 
Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Comm. (June 5, 1998), in S. REP. 
NO. 105-372, at 9 n.10 (1998). 
333 State v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1079–80, 1087 (D. Or. 2002), aff’d, 368 
F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) 
(finding that Attorney General Ashcroft exceeded the authority delegated to the 
Attorney General by the Controlled Substances Act, and finding that Congress did 
not intend, through the Controlled Substances Act or otherwise, to override state 
decisions concerning what constitutes the legitimate practice of medicine). 
334 Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1120. 
335 Id. at 1131. 
336 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
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with Dignity Act.337  Furthermore, the Court held that the 
Attorney General may not issue a directive if the federal statute 
is not ambiguous and if Congress has not specifically delegated 
that role to the Attorney General.338  The Court found that the 
Controlled Substances Act was not ambiguous:  Congress had 
delegated to the Attorney General only the authority to 
promulgate rules relating to “registration” and “control” of the 
dispensing of controlled substances.339  The Court further stated 
that “control” means “to add a drug or substance . . . to a 
schedule”340 following specified procedures, and that because the 
Directive did not concern scheduling of substances and was not 
issued under the required procedures, it could not fall under the 
Attorney General’s control authority.341 
The Court also found that the Attorney General’s Directive 
could not be justified under the Controlled Substances Act’s 
registration provisions because it deals with much more than 
registration342 and it does not undertake the Act’s five-factor 
analysis for determining when registration is “inconsistent with 
the public interest.”343  The Gonzales majority based its decision 
on a close reading of the Controlled Substances Act and focused 
its result on the administrative power of the Attorney General, 
stating that the Attorney General’s Directive purported to 
declare that using controlled substances for PAD is a crime,344 
which requires authority “well beyond the Attorney General’s 
statutory power to register or deregister [physicians].”345 
By focusing on the administrative power of the Attorney 
General, the Gonzales majority avoided the preemption and 
federalism issues raised in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.  The 
Ninth Circuit suggested that any effort to limit an Oregon statute 
 
337 Id. at 274–75.  Justice Kennedy authored the opinion.  He was joined in the 
majority opinion by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  
Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas dissented. 
338 Id. at 255–56. 
339 Id. at 259 (interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 821 (2006)). 
340 Id. at 260 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 802(5) (2006)). 
341 Id. 
342 Id. at 249. 
343 Id. at 250–51 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2006)). 
344 Id. at 261. 
345 Id.  Thus, the Ashcroft directive was not entitled to either Auer or Chevron 
deference.  Id. at 269. 
 966 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 895 
defining legitimate medical practice in that state would require a 
clear statement of preemption in the federal statute.346  In some 
respects, the Gonzales court appeared to accept the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning.  Although the Court concluded that it was 
“unnecessary even to consider the application of clear statement 
requirements . . . or presumptions against pre-emption . . . to 
reach [its] commonsense conclusion.”347  It also noted: 
Just as the conventions of expression indicate that Congress is 
unlikely to alter a statute’s obvious scope and division of 
authority through muffled hints, the background principles of 
our federal system also belie the notion that Congress would 
use such an obscure grant of authority to regulate areas 
traditionally supervised by the States’ police power.
348
 
Similarly, the Court indicated that Ashcroft’s effort to make 
actions that were authorized by Oregon’s Death with Dignity 
Act illegal would have given him: 
[T]he power to effect a radical shift of authority from the 
States to the Federal Government to define general standards 
of medical practice in every locality.  The text and structure of 
the [Controlled Substances Act] show that Congress did not 
have this far-reaching intent to alter the federal-state balance 
and the congressional role in maintaining it.
349
 
Justices Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas dissented.  Justice Scalia 
authored the primary dissent, and Justice Thomas wrote his own 
separate dissenting opinion in addition to joining the primary 
dissent. 
The dissenters not only voiced support for the authority of the 
Attorney General to issue the Ashcroft Directive, but they also 
disputed the majority’s deference for state sovereignty over the 
PAD issue.  First, Justice Scalia acknowledged federalism 
concerns by stating: 
 The Court’s decision today is perhaps driven by a feeling 
that the subject of assisted suicide is none of the Federal 
Government’s business.  It is easy to sympathize with that 
position.  The prohibition or deterrence of assisted suicide is 
certainly not among the enumerated powers conferred on the 
United States by the Constitution, and it is within the realm of 
 
346 Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004). 
347 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 275 (citations omitted). 
348 Id. 
349 Id. 
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public morality (bonos mores) traditionally addressed by the 
so-called police power of the States.
350
 
However, the dissenters went on to waive aside the federalism 
objection, justifying use of the expanded Commerce Clause for 
their conclusion that the Attorney General’s interpretation of 
the Controlled Substances Act was an appropriate way to 
emasculate Oregon’s Act: 
From an early time in our national history, the Federal 
Government has used its enumerated powers, such as its power 
to regulate interstate commerce, for the purpose of protecting 
public morality . . . . Unless we are to repudiate a long and 
well-established principle of our jurisprudence, using the 
federal commerce power to prevent assisted suicide is 
unquestionably permissible.  The question before us is not 
whether Congress can do this, or even whether Congress 
should do this; but simply whether Congress has done this in 
the CSA.  I think there is no doubt that it has.
351
 
Justice Scalia’s stance in the primary dissent is puzzling.  In 
other Supreme Court opinions, Justice Scalia had espoused the 
importance of initiatives and states’ rights.352  With respect to 
morality in the context of abortion, he specifically chided the 
Court for intruding on state sovereignty.353  Consistent with this 
leaning, Justice Scalia, in 2002, complained to an audience at 
Lewis and Clark Law School in Oregon that judges should not 
usurp the role of legislatures.354  In Justice Scalia’s opinion, if 
people wanted to extend rights like assisted suicide, they should 
 
350 Id. at 298 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
351 Id. at 298–99. 
352 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996) (Scalia, J., joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[Amendment 2, a citizen initiative,] 
put directly, to all the citizens of the State, the question:  Should homosexuality be 
given special protection?  They answered no.  The Court today asserts that this 
most democratic of procedures is unconstitutional.”); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 114 (2004) 
(Kennedy, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 
538 U.S. 721, 741 (1972) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
353 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (arguing the Court should not assert its sovereignty in a field in which it 
has little business). 
354 Solomon, supra note 240, at 23. 
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do it like the people of Oregon did, through the initiative-
legislative process, not through the courts.355 
In the Gonzales dissent, however, Justice Scalia suggests that 
the Supreme Court should defer to the Attorney General’s 
interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act.  Thus, he would 
give “a single Executive officer,”356 who is not elected, power to 
usurp the effort of Oregon citizens to extend their PAD rights 
through the initiative process.  Further, this dissent urged 
nonelected members of the Court to interpret the Controlled 
Substances Act to usurp Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act by 
concluding that “[v]irtually every relevant source of 
authoritative meaning confirms that the phrase ‘legitimate 
medical purpose’ does not include intentionally assisted 
suicide.”357 
Justice Thomas’s separate dissent in Gonzales is also 
disturbing.  Justice Thomas has been one of the most vocal 
supporters of the citizen initiative process.358  In Gonzales v. 
 
355 See id.; see also Robin K. Chand, Note, Deconstructing Gonzales v. Oregon:  
When Political Agendas Yield to Rudimentary Notions of Federalism and Statutory 
Interpretation, 50 HOW. L.J. 229, 255–57 (2006). 
356 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 275; see also Friedman, supra note 13, at 392 (“Congress 
often shirks important decisions by foisting them off on bureaucratic officials.”); id. 
at 392 n.317 (citing DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 
966–67 (1993) (arguing that legislators delegate powers of standard creation to 
agencies in order to avoid conflict issues)).  “Commentators especially point to 
actors in administrative agencies.”  Id. at 394 n.325 (citing John Devlin, Toward a 
State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers:  Legislators and Legislative 
Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1268 
(1993) (arguing that the ability of legislators to appoint administrative officials 
“raises obvious problems of lack of electoral accountability”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 447 (1987) (noting 
that agency actors are “not responsive to the public as a whole”)). 
357 Solomon, supra note 240, at 23 (noting that although the court took a pretty 
good whack at John Ashcroft for assuming more power than Congress granted, the 
court was unanimous in its view that Congress could ban assisted suicides under the 
Commerce Clause). 
358 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 883–84 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, J., Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A 
constitutional amendment, enacted by initiative,] is not the act of a state legislature; 
it is the act of the people of [the state], adopted at a direct election and inserted into 
the State Constitution.  The majority never explains why giving effect to the 
people’s decision would violate the ‘democratic principles’ that undergird the 
Constitution.”).  Justice O’Connor hails from Arizona, which is a strong initiative 
state, and her departure from the Court may impact recognition of the initiative 
power in future Supreme Court decisions.  Four other justices are also from 
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Raich, Justice Thomas dissented when the majority found the 
Controlled Substances Act preempted California’s medical 
marijuana initiative.359  He especially railed against the 
majority’s intrusion into state rights:  “One searches the Court’s 
opinion in vain for any hint of what aspect of American life is 
reserved to the States.”360  Furthermore, he touted the 
federalism benefit that the majority decision stifled by saying: 
 The majority prevents States like California from devising 
drug policies that they have concluded provide much-needed 
respite to the seriously ill.  It does so without any serious 
inquiry into the necessity for federal regulation or the 
propriety of “displac[ing] state regulation in areas of 
traditional state concern.”  The majority’s rush to embrace 
federal power “is especially unfortunate given the importance 
of showing respect for the sovereign States that comprise our 
Federal Union.”  Our federalist system, properly understood, 
allows California and a growing number of other States to 
decide for themselves how to safeguard the health and welfare 
of their citizens.
361
 
Remarkably, Justice Thomas reversed his federalism position 
in the Gonzales dissent.  In Raich, he urged the federal 
government to avoid interfering with state issues determined by 
 
initiative states:  Justices Kennedy and Breyer are both from California; Justice 
Stevens is from Illinois; and Justice Souter is from Massachusetts, which has a 
modified initiative process. 
359 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
360 Id. at 70.  Justice Thomas wrote: 
 The majority holds that Congress may regulate intrastate cultivation and 
possession of medical marijuana under the Commerce Clause, because 
such conduct arguably has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  The 
majority’s decision is further proof that the “substantial effects” test is a 
“rootless and malleable standard” at odds with the constitutional design. 
 . . . . 
 One searches the Court’s opinion in vain for any hint of what aspect of 
American life is reserved to the States.  Yet this Court knows that “[t]he 
Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers.”  That is 
why today’s decision will add no measure of stability to our Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence:  This Court is willing neither to enforce limits on 
federal power, nor to declare the Tenth Amendment a dead letter.  If 
stability is possible, it is only by discarding the stand-alone substantial 
effects test and revisiting our definition of “Commerce among the several 
States.”  Congress may regulate interstate commerce–not things that 
affect it, even when summed together, unless truly “necessary and proper” 
to regulating interstate commerce. 
Id. at 67–71. 
361 Id. at 74 (citations omitted). 
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citizen initiative; in Gonzales he dissented even though the 
Court upheld Oregon’s initiative law by determining that the 
Attorney General had no authority to interfere with it.  Justice 
Thomas’s sole explanation for his conclusion in Gonzales was his 
unhappiness about how the Court dealt with similar issues in 
Raich.362 
As justification for the result in Gonzales, it would be overly 
simplistic to observe that all of the dissenting justices are 
Catholics.363  Whatever the cause, the realignment of former 
federalism advocates over to the federal, instead of the state, 
side of the PAD issue is somewhat startling.364 
Although PAD rights advocates may have little chance of 
making much progress through the Supreme Court for years to 
come, the Gonzales decision appears to reaffirm the role of 
federalism and the initiative process in providing some 
resolutions on this controversial issue. 
 
 
362 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 302 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
Justice Thomas stated: 
The Court’s reliance upon the constitutional principles that it rejected in 
Raich [“limitations of federalism, which allow the States ‘great latitude 
under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, 
limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons,’” Id. at 270 (majority 
opinion)]–albeit under the guise of statutory interpretation–is perplexing 
to say the least. 
Id. at 302 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
363 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Roberts are all Catholic.  Joan Biskupic, 
Opinion, Changing Faith, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1996, at C1; Dennis Coyle, Studying 
John Roberts, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 1, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/ 
comment/coyle200509010733.asp. 
364 Considering the vehemence with which the Catholic Church has opposed the 
expansion of PAD rights, it is interesting to consider that the most recently sworn 
justice, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., is a Catholic.  Warren Richey, Role of Alito’s Catholic 
Faith Could Be Tricky Question, CHI. SUN TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, at A30.  Justice 
Anthony Kennedy is also a Catholic.  Biskupic, supra note 363, at C1.  Although 
Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Gonzales, he has joined the other 
Catholic justices on several five-to-four majority opinions in 2007.  Kennedy sided 
with Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito in thirteen of the nineteen five-to-four split 
decisions issued by the Supreme Court in the 2006-07 term.  See Stuart Taylor, Jr. & 
Evan Thomas, The Power Broker, NEWSWEEK, July 16, 2007, at 36, 36–37 (quoting 
one of Kennedy’s former clerks saying, “He thinks he is the living embodiment or 
transmitter of the nation’s bedrock values.”).  Also, the fact that Kennedy authored 
the majority opinion in Gonzales might explain why it is so restrained, focusing 
primarily on the scope of the Attorney General’s administrative powers. 
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CONCLUSION 
In establishing one of the first large-scale democracies in the 
modern world, the Founders appeased states’ rights advocates 
through the construct of federalism.  Federalism blended 
national and local power by granting the federal government 
limited enumerated authority and reserving to the states and the 
people some measure of decentralized authority over their 
affairs.  This diffusion of power helped legitimize the 
government and allowed for a robust democracy that is more 
responsive and accountable to those governed. 
One of the advantages of federalism is that states may act as 
laboratories for social experimentation allowing the entire 
country to benefit from the influx of diverse ideas from a variety 
of sources.  Innovation is an evolutionary process that works 
best when experimentation is diffused.  The odds of finding 
creative solutions improve when multiple governments are 
working on alternative options.  Legislation that centralizes and 
limits experimentation can stifle progress in areas in which there 
is no need for national uniformity. 
The debate over physician-assisted death illustrates the key 
role citizen initiatives can play in federalism by helping create 
state laboratories of experimentation to address controversial 
issues.  Although polls show that a majority of Americans 
support PAD, neither Congress nor a single state legislature has 
enacted a statute legalizing it.  All bills introduced on the topic 
have been snared in the pressure points of the traditional 
legislative process. 
These pressure points were incorporated into the traditional 
legislative process to filter out extremes and achieve compromise 
legislation that reflected both majority and minority interests.  
However, minority interest groups can sometimes avoid 
compromise and instead impose their sensibilities on the 
majority by strategically employing the pressure points to block 
all legislation in a controversial area.  Minority view religious 
groups have been using this pressure point mechanism in 
legislatures throughout the country by enlisting a few influential 
legislators or requesting executive vetoes to block every single 
bill proposing to legalize PAD from successfully navigating 
through the traditional legislative process. 
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These same minority interest groups have not had the same 
degree of effectiveness in the context of citizen initiatives.  
Outspending PAD proponents has improved the odds of a 
minority interest prevailing in state legislatures and some 
initiative campaigns.  However, despite outspending the PAD 
proponents by as much as six to one, the minority interest 
religious groups were not able to prevent the majority of Oregon 
citizens from voicing their preference by enacting the only law in 
the country that legalizes PAD. 
Oregon alone was successful in passing a pro-PAD statute 
because the law was enacted by citizen initiative.  Some criticize 
citizen initiatives as “fast-food government” because they can 
circumvent the more time consuming traditional legislative 
process.  Yet, precisely because initiatives can avoid some of the 
shortcomings of the traditional process, they are sometimes the 
best, or the only, choice for addressing controversial issues that 
cannot make it through the legislative pressure points. 
The Supreme Court has failed to recognize a constitutional 
“right to die,” and Congress has failed to pass specific legislation 
on the issue, so the debate over physician-assisted death has 
become an exemplar for the role of citizen initiatives in allowing 
states to serve as laboratories in a federalism model.  Oregon’s 
Act is initiative lawmaking at its best.  A clear majority of 
Oregonians supported the law:  they voted twice on the topic 
and on the second vote, affirmed the law by a majority of 
approximately sixty percent.  Furthermore, PAD is the type of 
issue that most appropriately should be resolved at the local, as 
opposed to the federal, level.  It involves health, a traditional 
state concern.  It is a highly personal, moral issue that does not 
directly impact or infringe the rights of others.  Furthermore, 
there is no commercial or other reason for national uniformity. 
Fast-food chains thrive in the United States because they 
serve a need of the people.  Sometimes fast-food fare is not good 
for us, but other times it can really hit the spot.  Although the 
fast-food initiative process is imperfect in some contexts, 
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act illustrates that an initiative 
really can be the best mechanism for promoting federalism.  By 
allowing power to diffuse to the citizen level, Oregon citizens 
were able to achieve something that no state legislature has been 
able to accomplish:  the creation of a state laboratory for social 
experimentation on physician-assisted death. 
